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AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE IN
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LITIGATIONt
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A new defense to employment discrimination claims has gained
acceptance in the lower courts. Employers who allegedly have discrimi-
nated against their employees because of race, sex or age are winning
judgments on the basis of after-acquired evidence of employee miscon-
duct.' The evidence is "after-acquired" in the sense that the misconduct
was unknown to the employer at the time the alleged discrimination
occurred2 but was acquired later, often through the use of discovery
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I To date, the bulk of after-acquired evidence cases have arisen under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1988) and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1988) [hereinafter ADEA]. Those statutes, accordingly, are the
primary focus of this Article. Similar issues regarding after-acquired evidence can arise in litiga-
tion under other employment discrimination statutes, such as section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988) or the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C, §§ 12101 et seq. (1990) [hereinafter
ADA], and the analysis presented here is useful for resolution of claims under those statutes as
well.
In addition, questions on the proper use of after-acquired evidence have arisen in common
law claims for wrongful discharge. See, e.g., Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409,
412 (6th Cir. 1992). While this Article may prove useful in such cases, it does not directly address
concerns unique to common law claims.
2 The typical discrimination case is one presenting a claim of individual disparate treatment.
See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. Riw. 983 (1991).
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment,
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
In such cases, an employer denying liability generally will contend it did not base the decision
at issue on the protected classification but instead will assert it acted because of a legitimate,
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devices in the employee's discrimination action.3 Lower courts have
accepted the proposition that if the employer would have discharged
the plaintiff on the basis of the after-acquired evidence, then the
defendant is not liable for employment discrimination, and the plain-
tiff, accordingly, is entitled to no relief. 4
nondiscriminatory reason. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55
(1981). The question For the trier of fact is then to determine the "true reason" for the employer's
action. Id. at 256. If the "true reason" is a discriminatory one, then the plaintiff wins, St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 (1993).
After-acquired evidence cases, in contrast, involve legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
unknown to the employer at the time the adverse employment decision was made. The question
is what role this after-acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing should play in employment
discrimination litigation, when the evidence admittedly was not relied upon in making the
challenged decision.
To date, this issue has received scant attention in the law reviews. An exception is Mitchell
H. Rubinstein, The Use of &e-Discharge Misconduct Discovered After An Employee's Termination as
a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (1990). While this Article was in the
editing stage, moreover, the following student commentaries appeared: William M. Muth, Jr.,
Note, The After
-Acquired Evidence Doctrine in Title VII Cases and the Challenge Presented by Wallace
v. Dunn Construction Co., 72 NEB. L. REV. 330 (1993); Jennifer Miyoko Follette, Comment,
Complete Justice: Upholding the Principles of Title VII Through Appropriate Treatment of After-Ac-
quired Evidence, 68 WASH. L. REV. 651 (1993).
In addition, practitioner-oriented journals recently have recognized and discussed the grow-
ing importance of this issue. See Geofge D. Mesritz, After-Acquired' Evidence of Pre -Employment
Misrepresentations: An Effective Defense Against Wrongful Discharge Claims, 18 Em Pi.. REL. L. J. 215
(1992); Morley Witus, Defense of Wrongful Discharge Suits Based on Employee's Misrepresentation,
69 MICH. BAR. J. 50 (1990); Douglas L. Williams & Julia A. Davis, Title VII Update—Skeletons and
a Double-Edged Sward, ALI-ABA (1991); New Defense For Bias Suits: Attack, FULTON Comm: DAILY
REPORT, Mar. 12, 1993.
3 See, e.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1993); Milli-
gan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304-05 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
2991, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (Aug. 10, 1993); Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955
E2d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1992); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1177-78 (11th Cir.
1992); Reed v. Amax Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1992); Moodie v. Federal Reserve
Bank of N.Y., 831 F. Supp. 333, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Smith v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 60 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1225, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305,
307 (E.D.Va. 1993); O'Day v. McDonnell-Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D.
Ariz. 1992); Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1105-06 (D. Cola. 1992); Bazzi
v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co,, 808 F. Supp. 1306, 1308-09 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Benson v.
Quanex Corp., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743, 745 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Colter J. Thermal
Science, Inc., 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 93 (E.D. Mo. 1992); McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Pub. Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 605-06 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), affd, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 354
(6th Cir. 1993); Grzenia v. Interspec., Inc., 1991 WL 222105 *1-2 (N.D. III. 1991); Livingston v.
Sorg Printing Co., 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1417, 1418 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). In many of these
cases, it is doubtful whether the evidence ever would have been discovered by the employer had
the discrimination claim not been brought.
The Eleventh Circuit, in one of the few cases rejecting the after-acquired evidence defense,
denies any reduction in the plaintiff's backpay remedy based on after-acquired evidence unless
the defendant proves it would have discovered the evidence independent of the litigation.
Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182. See also Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel Sc Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314,
323-24 (D.N.J. 1993). For discussion of this point, see infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
4 See Milligan -Jensen, 975 F.2d at 304-05; Johnson, 955 F.2d at 414; Dotson v. United States
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Those courts granting judgment to the defendant do so without
resolving the discrimination claim. 5 Their discussion of the employer's
conduct generally is limited to a conclusory recitation of the alleged
discrimination; the opinions then proceed to describe with great spe-
cificity the misconduct with which the plaintiff is charged' This rhe-
torical imbalance' tends to submerge the central feature of the after-
Postal Serv., 977 F.2d 976,977-78 (6th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 263 (1992);
Paglio v. Chagrin Valley Hunt Club Corp., 966 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished order);
Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250,256-57 (7th Cir. 1992); Reed v. Amax Coal Co., 971
F.2d 1295,1297 (7th Cir. 1992); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Iris. Co., 864 F.2d 700,707
(10th Cir. 1988); Russell, 830 F. Supp. at 308; O'Day, 784 F. Stipp. at 1468-69; Bonger, 789 F. Supp.
at 1105-06; McKennart, 797 F. Supp. at 605-06; Sweeney v. U-Haul Co., 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1257,1259-60 (N.D. III. 1991); Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515,520 (D.
Kan. 1991); O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 E Stipp. 656,660 (D. Utah 1990); Mathis v. Boeing
Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991,994 (D. Kan, 1989).
5 See Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 4. The Sixth Circuit, moreover, has granted judgment in
an after-acquired evidence case, despite the district court's determination that discrimination had
occurred. Milligan -Jensen, 975 F.2d at 303. As bluntly stated by the Sixth Circuit, whether the
defendant discriminated is "irrelevant," Id at 304-05. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the Sixth Circuit's denial of a remedy to the plaintiff was proper; certiorari
was dismissed, however, when the parties settled the case. Milligan-Jensen, 114 S. Ct. at 22.
6 See, e.g., Summers, 864 F.2d at 702-03, A notable exception to this approach is Milligan-Jen-
sen, 975 F,2d at 304-05. There, the district court had found for the plaintiff' on her sex discrimi-
nation claim, detailing the stark evidence of disparate treatment on which it had relied, Milligan-
Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 767 F. Supp. 1403,1406-10 (W.D. Mich. 1991). Plaintiff, the only
female public safety officer for the University, was told she had the "lady's job" as a "meter maid,"
was issued the "woman's badge" number and was criticized for her uniform and dress while her
male co-workers were not. M at 1409. The district court, however, reduced plaintiff's backpay
award by 50%, due to after-acquired evidence, obtained through discovery, that plaintiff had not
revealed a driving under the influence conviction on her employment application. Id. at 1416-17.
The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the resume fraud dispositive of plaintiff's claim, despite the
finding of intentional discrimination. Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 304-05.
Another exception is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodscrvice
Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993). In that case, the trial court had granted JNOV to the defendant,
after a jury determined that the defendant had committed willful violations of the ADEA, based
on after-acquired evidence that the plaintiff had inflated his educational credentials on his
resume. 1991 WL 203799 *1-2 (W.D. Ill. 1991). In reversing, the Seventh Circuit detailed the
evidence of age discrimination and retaliation by the company, and reinstated the plaintiffs
verdict. Kristufek, 985 F.2d at 366-68. It is unclear, however, whether the Seventh Circuit believed
the after-acquired evidence irrelevant to liability or whether it believed the jury had rejected the
defendant's assertion that it would have fired the plaintiff had it known of the falsification. There
is language in the case pointing in both directions. Compare 985 F.2d at 369 with 985 F.2d at 370.
Moreover, despite upholding the jury verdict, the appeals court modified the award to deny all
backpay and attorneys' fees from the time the fraud was discovered. Id. at 371.
7
 The EEOC has recognized this point, arguing that a liability determination on the discrimi-
nation claim should occur in after-acquired evidence cases, not only because such evidence is not
liability limiting, but also because the extent and nature of the defendant's wrongdoing may be
important in fashioning relief. As the agency stated, "[t]he court bears witness to the wrongful
conduct of the plaintiff but not to the illegal conduct of the employer. Such a skewed perspective
would invariably tip the scales in favor of the aftenacquired evidence and undermine the effective
enforcement of the anti-discrimination statutes." Amicus Brief fbr EEOC at 14, O'Day v. McDon-
nell-Douglas Helicopter, 92-15625 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Mesritz, supra note 2, at 225-26.
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acquired evidence defense; a court that recognizes the defense as a
total bar to relief grants an employer absolution even for outrageously "
discriminatory conduct.
Applications of the after-acquired evidence defense have prolifer-
ated rapidly.' In the wake of initial judicial acceptance of the defense,
apparently few defense counsel have missed the opportunity to turn a
plaintiffs deposition into a search for her own wrongdoing. 9 It is
unlikely that employment discrimination plaintiffs have become more
dishonest or otherwise "flawed" in recent years; instead, employers
have found a judiciary willing to deny relief to a plaintiff who is a
wrongdoer and have pursued this avenue aggressively. Since few work-
ers are perfect, the courts' acceptance of the after-acquired evidence
defense has the potential to extinguish a large number of otherwise
viable claims.
Employers not only have been winning most of the after-acquired
evidence cases in the lower federal courts, but they have been winning
them early, at the summary judgment stage.m Courts routinely accept
as sufficient the affidavit of a company official stating that the employer
would have discharged the plaintiff had the company been aware of
'Within the last four years, numerous reported cases have used after-acquired evidence to
dispose of plaintiffs' discrimination claims. See .supra note 4. There is, of course, no way of
knowing how many additional cases are settled, dismissed or never filed because of the developing
recognition of this defense.
As recently noted by the court in Raab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F, Supp. 1246, 1254 (N.D.
Ohio 1993), "the after-acquired evidence doctrine is gaining increasing acceptance among state
courts. In courts applying federal law, the trend is clearly in favor or its application." See also
Williams & Davis, supra note 2, at 6 (noting trend of decisions to accept after-acquired evidence
as defense not only to remedy but to liability).
9 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Indeed, in a jurisdiction accepting the after-ac-
quired evidence defense, an employer's lawyer would be remiss were she not to engage in such
an inquiry during discovery. As one defense lawyer has candidly advised: "Management attorneys
should respond to this favorable development by routinely searching for pre-employment mis-
representations as a potential defense in all discharge litigation. Employers in turn should
maximize the probability that 'after-acquired' evidence is available as a defense by revising
employment applications to elicit even more specific information." Mesritz, supra note 2, at 215.
See also Witus, supra note 2.
°While the courts have viewed after-acquired evidence as an affirmative defense, placing
the burden on defendants to show they would have tired or refused to hire the plaintiff had they
known of the wrongdoing, see Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co.. 968 F.2d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing after-acquired evidence has been viewed by most courts as affirmative defense),
Williams & Davis, supra note 2, at 7 (same), defendants typically have satisfied this burden
through submitting an affidavit from a company official so stating. Although the courts have
recognized that these affidavits are "self-serving," they nonetheless have found them a sufficient
basis on which to grant summary judgment for the defendant, because "there is no evidence to
rebut the declaration that [defendant] would have terminated the plaintiff's employment had
her actions been discovered." Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Colo.
1992).
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the after-acquired evidence." The affidavit is treated as determinative
despite its self-serving and hypothetical assertions. 12
The after-acquired evidence defense in its current form amounts
to an enormous loophole in the interpretation of our civil rights laws
that must be closed. These are not isolated cases involving egregious
employee wrongdoing.' 3 Instead, they are cases that provoke renewed
" See, e.g., Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson V. Honey-
well Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992); McKennon v. The Nashville Banner Pub.
Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 608 (M.D. Tenn. 1992); Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 E Stipp.
1102, 1106 (D. Colo. 1992); O'Day v. McDonnell-Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466,
1468-69 (D. Ariz. 1992); O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Stipp. 656, 659 (D. Utah 1990). The
EEOC, in its amicus curiae brief to the Sixth Circuit in the MeKennon case, has criticized reliance
on employer affidavits and has-urged adoption of an "objective evidence" starsdarcl.Amicus Curiae
Brief of EEOC, McKennon v. Nashville Banner, No. 92-5917 (6th Cir. 1992).
13
 It is at least open to question whether the determinative significance routinely accorded
to employers' affidavits in these cases is consistent with summary judgment doctrine. The after-
acquired evidence defense should be treated as an affirmative defense, with the employer carrying
the burdens of production and persuasion. See supra note 10. An employer's affidavit should be
sufficient to support summary judgment, therefore, only if the affidavit swings the evidence so
far in the employer's direction that no reasonable fact-finder could find against the employer on
the question of what the employer would have done. Cf., e.g., Banger v. Wayne County, 950 F.2d
316, 322-23 (6th Cir. 1991) (employer is entitled to summary judgment on affirmative defense
only if employer is able to show that the evidence is so one-sided that no reasonable jury could
find far plaintiff). If the employer's affidavit. fails to pass this threshold test, then it should not
matter whether the plaintiff can submit a sufficient counter-affidavit. See, e.g., United States v.
Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991) (when movant with burden
of persuasion makes initial showing that would entitle it to directed verdict at trial, then non-
tnovant must come forward with significant, probative evidence of triable issue of fact). There is
at least morn for doubt whether an affidavit on the would-have-discharged question, executed by
someone under the employer's influence, and making a claim about what the employer would
have done, routinely should be treated as conclusive, preen -slitting the plaintiff's right to a trial
on the question. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAI., MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, Civil.
PROCEDURE § 9.3, at 447 (2d ed. 1993) (if opponent of summary judgment can show some reason
why witness might be disbelieved at trial, as, for example, if witness would profit personally from
outcome its favor of movant, then summary judgment is inappropriate, because credibility of
witness clearly is in issue); of id. at 447-48 (in many circumstances, only way to counter person's
affidavit about his or her own intent is to have person appear at trial and be subjected to formal
examination before trier of fact; in such cases summary judgment should be denied).
13 The majority of the cases involve 'puffing" of educational credentials or work experience
on the employment application or during the interview. See, e.g., Kristufek v. Huissmann Food-
service Co., 985 E2c1 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993); Reed v. Amax Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th
Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 411-12 (601 Cir. 1992); Smith v.
General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1316-17 (7th Cis -. 1989); Bazzi v. Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co., 808 F. Stipp. 1306, 1307 (E.D. Mich. 199'2). While such dishonesty is not commendable,
it is also not unconunon. According to surveys reported by Professor Rubinstein, "one in tell
companies found applicants lying on their resumes." Rubinstein, supra note 2, at n.2. A 1988
Equifax Study of 200 randomly selected resumes revealed that 3% misrepresented college de-
grees, 3% identified false employers, 3% listed nonexistent jobs, 4% misidentified job titles, 11%
misrepresented reasons for leaving previous employers and one-third gave inaccurate dates of
past jobs. Mesritz, supra note 2, at 222; see also Williams & Davis, supra note 2, at 1.
Some cases, however, involve more serious falsifications, such as a failure to disclose past
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discussion of what causation means in employment discrimination law,
of what harms discrimination can inflict, and of what remedies Con-
gress intended to provide to persons, who though guilty of wrongdo-
ing, nonetheless were victims of unlawful conduct at the hands of their
employers.
This Article criticizes the approach to the after-acquired evidence
defense that is emerging in the lower courts. The Article rejects the
premise that a plaintiff must be "fire proof" in order to prevail in an
employment discrimination action. It argues that after-acquired evi-
dence of a plaintiffs misconduct should have no impact on an em-
ployer's liability for discrimination. In liability determinations, the
focus should be on what the employer actually did and not on what
the employer might have done had it not discriminated." Discrimina-
tory conduct causes harm and deserves legal condemnation even when
the conduct would have been justifiable on other grounds. 15
Accordingly, after-acquired evidence should matter only in deter-
mining appropriate remedies. If an employer can demonstrate that it
would have discharged the plaintiff on the basis of the after-acquired
evidence, then the plaintiff should not be awarded backpay beyond
the point at which the employer actually discovers the discharge-gen-
erating evidence. 16
 Moreover, the plaintiff should not be entitled to
criminal conduct, see, e.g., Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1992); Benson
v. Quanex Corp., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743, 745 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Mathis v. Boeing
Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991, 992-93 (D. Kan. 1989), or past terminations by other
employers, see, e.g., Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 317 (D.NJ. 1993).
14 See infra notes 80-102 and accompanying text. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), adopts this approach for Title VII cases. EEOC Decision No. 915-002,
Revised Enforcement Guidance on Recent Developments in Disparate Treatment Theory, 1992
WL 189088 (July 14, 1992) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance]. See also EEOC's Office
of General Counsel's Advice Memorandum, March 1, 1993, 61 EPD 'I 5371. This Article, for the
reasons explored herein, agrees with the EEOC's position and explains why it is well-founded.
While the guidelines accurately state how the law should be construed, a detailed analysis of why
that position is correct is supplied by this Article.
The 1991 amendments to Title VII, moreover, reinforce the conclusion that after-acquired
evidence is not liability limiting. Section 107 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act states that, "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this title, an unlawfbl employment practice is established when the com-
plaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." Pub.
L. No. 102-166, § 107 (Nov. 21, 1992).
Section 107 further provides that remedies may be limited when an employer demonstrates
it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor." Id.
For a discussion of § 107 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, see infra notes 134-43, 180-93 and
accompanying text.
II See infra notes 103-33 and accompanying text.
16 Some courts have so reasoned, as has the EEOC. See, e.g., Smith v. General Scanning, Inc.,
876 F.2d 1315, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1989); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 14. For
discussion of this point, see infra notes 147-67 and accompanying text.
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reinstatement and ordinarily should be denied injunctive relief as well.
The principle underlying these limitations on remedies is that even a
prevailing plaintiff in an employment discrimination action remains
vulnerable to workplace discipline, up to and including discharge, so
long as the discipline is imposed for nondiscriminatory reasons. An
employer who proves the after-acquired evidence defense should be
permitted to treat the plaintiffs employment as at an end from the
point at which the employer actually discovers discharge-generating
evidence, even when the evidence is discovered as a result of the
discrimination claim." Importantly, however, after-acquired evidence
should not preclude declaratory relief, partial backpay, attorney's fees,
anti, if otherwise available, compensatory and punitive damages.' 8
Part I of this Article describes the development of the after-ac-
quired evidence defense. Part II makes the case that after-acquired
evidence should have no effect on an employer's liability for employ-
ment discrimination. Part III defends the proposition that while a
plaintiff should be denied the prospective remedies of full backpay and
reinstatement, and ordinarily should be denied injunctive relief if an
employer can prove that it would have discharged the plaintiff on the
basis of after-acquired evidence, the prevailing plaintiff remains enti-
tled to declaratory relief, attorney's fees, partial backpay, and, where
available, compensatory and punitive damages.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE
The after-acquired evidence defense in employment discrimina-
tion litigation is of relatively recent origin. While courts had flirted with
it from time to time,w it was not until the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
17 See infra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
114 See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 14, at 20-23 and infra notes 173-99 and
accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2c1 614, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984); Kneisley v. Hercules, Inc., 577 F. Stipp. 726, 755 (D. Del. 1983).
The National Labor Relations Board, moreover, has wrestled with the question of after-ac-
quired evidence off and on since the late 1950s. Initially, the Board considered after-acquired
evidence a total bar to recovery, but not a defense to the underlying unfair labor practice charge.
SeeSotithern Airways Co. & Ass'n of Machinists, AFL.C1O, 124 N.L.R.B. 749, 762-65 (1959).
It later changed course, finding the after-acquired evidence inadmissible for any purpose. Big
Three Welding Equip. Co. & johnie Cecil Gripon, Rubble C. Gentry, Jr., Guy W. East, 145 N.L.R.B,
1685, 1698-99 (1964). Presently, it allows the after-acquired evidence to cut off backpay liability
as of the time (he after-acquired evidence was discovered. John Cunco, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. No.
125 at 821 (1990). For a discussion of the NLRB's treatment of after-acquired evidence, see
Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 6-16.
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Co. in 1988 that it gained acceptance.° In Summers, an employer
discovered, in the course of trial preparation on its former employee's
age discrimination claims, that the employee had committed over 150
instances of records falsifications during his employment as an insur-
ance claims adjuster. 21 The employer promptly moved for summary
judgment based on this newly discovered evidence, and the motion was
granted." Acknowledging that the after-acquired evidence could not
be considered a "cause" for the discharge decision," the court none-
theless found the evidence relevant to the question of injury. 24 Con-
cluding that the after-acquired evidence precluded the granting of any
remedy to the plaintiff, the court found no injury and, consequently,
no claim . 25
The Summers court explained its reasoning by constructing a col-
orful hypothetical that would prove influential in the development of
the law:
"Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 707 (10th Cir. 1988).
21 The employer had been aware of approximately 10 falsification instances during Summers'
employment but had refrained from discharging him because he had not profited from the
falsifications. Id. at 702. While preparing for trial, it discovered the 150 additional falsifications
and asserted that had it known of them, it would have fired Summers. Id. at 703.
22 Id at 707. In granting summary judgment, the court did not determine whether Summers
had been fired because of his age. Instead, it granted judgment because it determined the
employer would have fired Summers because of the 150 additional falsifications, had it known
about them. In granting judgment for the employer, the court termed it "immaterial" whether
the falsifications ever would have been discovered had no age discrimination claim been brought,
although it noted the falsifications probably would have been discovered anyway since the
employer had been monitoring Summers carefully once it learned of the 10 falsifications. Id. at
n.3.
at 704. As the Summers court correctly recognized, the after-acquired evidence could
not he deemed a cause for the discharge because a causation inquiry focuses on reasons known
to the employer and acted upon at the time of the discharge. Id. at 704-05. See infra notes 80-102
and accompanying text.
24 Summers, 864 F.2d at 705. The Tenth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist Bd. of Educ. V. Doyle, in which the Court found that an employer who
acts for both lawful and unlawful reasons can successfully defend itself by proving it would have
made the same decision had it relied on the lawful factors alone, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977).
The Mt. Healthy Court determined that a different result would place the employee in a better
position than he would have been in had he not engaged in protected conduct. /c/. at 785. The
Summers court similarly concluded that to allow Summers to proceed with his claim would be to
place him in a better position than he would have been in had no discrimination occurred. 864
F.2d at 708.
25 The Summers court appeared to equate a plaintiff's entitlement to a backpay or reinstate-
ment remedy with the existence of an "injury." A plaintiff, however, may be injured, even when
no monetary relief is available. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367, 371 (1993); Meritor
Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (hostile work environment claim actionable under
Title VII even though plaintiff suffers no tangible economic detriment). See also infra notes
116-33 and accompanying text for discussion of this point.
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To argue, as Summers does, that this after-acquired evidence
should be ignored is utterly unrealistic. The present case is
akin to the hypothetical wherein a company doctor is fired
because of his age, race, religion and sex and the company,
in defending a civil rights action, thereafter discovers that the
discharged employee was not a 'doctor.' In our view, the
masquerading doctor would be entitled to no relief, and
Summers is in no better position. 25
Although Summers involved employee misconduct occurring on
the job, the vast majority of the after-acquired evidence cases following
Summers have involved pre-hire misconduct, particularly resume
fraud.27 The typical scenario involves a plaintiff fired because of her
race or sex who sues to challenge the employer's action; then, during
discovery, the employer learns the employee falsified information on
the employment application or otherwise misrepresented her creden-
tials or background. 25 On these facts, the employer moves for judgment
26 Summers, 864 F.2d at 708. This hypothetical has been quoted by a number of courts that
have followed the approach adopted in Summers to after-acquired evidence. See, e.g., Milligan-
Jensen v. Michigan Tech Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304 (fith Cir. 1992); Washington v. Lake County,
969 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 415 (6th
Cir. 1992); Redd v. Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp. 547, 552 (W.1). Tex. 1993); Bonger v. American
Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (D. Colo. 1992); Benson v. Quancx Corp., 58 Fair Etnpl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 793, 797 (E.D. Mich, 1992); Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F. Supp.
487, 490 (D. Colo. 1991); Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 519 (D. Kan. 1991);
O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp, 656, 659 (D. Utah 1990).
27 See, e.g„ Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co,, 985 F.2d 364, 569 (7th Cir. 1993);
Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 305; Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1177-78 (11th Cir.
1992); Washington, 969 F.2d at 256-57; Reed v. Amax Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir.
1992); Johnson, 955 F.2(1 al 412; Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir.
1989); Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 616 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 969
U.S. 832 (1984); Bray v. Forest Pharmaceutical, Inc., 812 E Supp. 115, 117 (S.D. Ohio 1993);
Baab v. AMR Services Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1296, 1255-56 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Agbor v. Mountain
Fuel Supply Co., 810 F. Supp. 1247, 1251-52 (D. Utah 1993); George v. Myers, 1992 WL 97788
*1 (D. Kan. 1992); Benson, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 745; Bazzi v. Western & Southern
Life Ins. Co., 808 E Stipp. 1306, 1308-09 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Kravit v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 60
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994, 995-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Benitez v. Portland Gen. Elec., 799 F.
Supp. 1075 (D. Or. 1992); Grzenia v. Interspec., Inc., 1991 WL 222105 *1 (N.D. III. 1991);
Churchman, 756 E Supp. at 520; Sweeney v. U-Haul Co., 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat, (BNA) 1257,
1259 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Punahele, 756 F. Supp. at 489; Carroll v. City of Chicago, 1990 WL 37631
*1 (N.D. III. 1990); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Kan. 1989);
O'Driscoll, 745 F. Supp. at 660; Livingston v. Sorg Printing Co., 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1417, 1418 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
"That after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct most often comes from resumes or
employment applications should not he surprising. It is at the pre-employment stage that pro-
spective workers are asked to reveal educational and work histories, criminal records, and per-
sonal information, An applicant who has been discharged or convicted of a crime at some point
in the past has a strong incentive to conceal that information in order to obtain employment,
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in its favor, claiming it would not have hired or would have fired the
plaintiff had it known of the falsifications. 29 Courts have granted these
motions using various theories. One approach is that, because the
employment relationship is contractual, application of the common
law of contracts demands dismissal of the claim.'° Alternatively, some
courts have found that the after-acquired evidence precludes the plain-
tiff from making a prima facie case of employment discrimination. 3 '
But the most common theory underlying the after-acquired evi-
dence defense is one relying loosely on the "but for" causation princi-
ple established in cases of "mixed motive" discrimination.' 2 Under the
"but for" approach, liability is not present unless "but for" the discrimi-
nation, the adverse employment action would not have occurred. In
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle," NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 34 and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 35 -
the United States Supreme Court's "mixed motive" cases, the Court
determined that when a defendant, whose employment decisions were
based on both lawful and unlawful motives, could prove it would have
made the same decision had it not taken the unlawful motives into
account, it was entitled to judgment in its favor. 36 Courts in after-ac-
Similarly, an applicant may inflate . her educational credentials or work experience to enhance
her chances of employment. Once the employee is hired, the employer's concern is with her
ability to do the job, not with her background, and thus it is unlikely that a falsification undis-
covered during the hiring process will be uncovered after employment has begun.
After a lawsuit is filed, however, the plaintiff routinely is asked during depositions or other
forms of discovery about her background and frequently is questioned on the resume itself. At
that point, the employer learns for the first time about the misstatements.
29 As some courts have recognized, however, there is a distinction between an employer's
assertion that it would not have hired an applicant had it known of the fraud and an assertion
that it would have fired an employee after learning of the fraud. When the employer has hired
the worker, it is a showing that it would have fired the employee for the misstatement that is
relevant. See Reed, 971 F.2d at 1298, and infra note 105 and accompanying text for discussion of
this point.
" See, e.g.,Johnson, 955 F.2d at 412; Benson, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 746-47.
3] See, e.g., Dotson v. United States Postal Serv., 977 F.2d 976, 978 (6th Cir. 1992); Livingston,
49 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1418. See also Witus, supra note 2, at 52; Williams & Davis,
supra note 2, at 6.
32 See Williams & Davis, supra note 2 (noting 'origins" of after-acquired evidence defense are
found in Supreme Court's mixed motive cases); Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 6. A "mixed motive"
case is one in which the employer is found to have acted for a variety of reasons, both lawful and
unlawful. For a discussion of mixed motive cases, see, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Water-
house v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 495 (1990),
"429 U.S. 274, 785-86 (1977).
34 462 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1983).
55 490 U.S. 228, 242-43 (1989).
56 Whether the Court intended its decision in Mt. Healthy v. Doyle to be liability-limiting as
opposed to relief-limiting was uncertain. See Weber, supra note 32, at 500 n.25; Mark S. Brodin,
The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82
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quired evidence cases have read these decisions to mean that whenever
the employer can show the same adverse employment action would
have been justified in the absence of the discriminatory conduct, it is
entitled to judgment in its favor, even though the lawful motive was
not actually operating at the time the adverse and discriminatory
employment decision was made."
The courts have misstepped in going down each of these paths.
Neither contract law, the prima facie case approach, nor the "mixed
motive" analogy supports using after-acquired evidence to avoid liabil-
ity.
H. AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY
A. The Contract Law Approach
As mentioned above, many of the after-acquired evidence cases
involve resume fraud or other misrepresentations by plaintiffs during
the hiring process. In some of these cases, courts have entered judg-
ment for the defendant by reasoning that since the employer was
fraudulently induced to enter into the employment contract, it may
void the contract at its initiative and thereby avoid the discrimination
claim. 38
 Additionally, courts have reasoned that an employee may not
successfully sue for breach of contract if good cause to terminate the
contract existed, whether or not the employer knew of the cause at the
time of discharge." However, not just any untruth or nondisclosure will
Comm. L. REV. 292, 308 (1982). In Price Waterhouse, however, the Court made clear that an
employer who proves it would have made the same decision without regard to the unlawful factor
is entitled to a finding of no liability. 490 U.S. at. 242. This aspect of Price Waterhouse was
congressionally overruled in § 107 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See infra notes 134-42 and
accompanying text..
"See, e.g., Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1992); Summers v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 864 F.2d 700, 707 (10th Cir. 1988). While recognizing that mixed-mo-
tive cases differ from after-acquired evidence cases, these courts view the mixed-motive decisions
as sufficiently analogous to provide the appropriate framework for resolving after-acquired evi-
dence claims. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text
38 See cases cited supra note 30. See also Bazzi v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 808 F.
Supp. 1306, 1309-10 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (applying same analysis to state law breach of contract
claim). Commentators have urged employers to use this approach. See, e.g., Witns, supra note 2,
at 51; Mesritz, supra note 2, at 223; Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 16.
39 See cases cited supra note 30; see also elvish Cir. of Sussex County v. Whale, 432 A.2d 521,
525 (N.J. 1981) (employer entitled to rescind employment contract upon discovering fraudulent
misrepresentations on employee's resume); Odoneal v. Henry, 12 So. 154, 155 (Miss. 1892) (If
good and sufficient reasons for appellee's discharge existed, the appellants may set them up on
trial byway of defense, though they may not have known of them at the time oldie discharge.");
Loos v. George Walter Brewing Co., 129 N.W. 645, 646 (Wis. 1911) (same holding); Von Heyne
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void the contract. Instead, the misrepresentation must have been ma-
terial, must have been related to the hiring decision, and must have
been relied upon by the employer in deciding to hire the plaintiff. 40
While the employment relationship is contractual," and while this
reasoning might be appropriate were plaintiff bringing a claim for
breach of contract, 42 contract principles may not be routinely trans-
planted into the law of employment discrimination. Employment dis-
crimination statutes impose on employers a duty not to discriminate
on the basis of the prohibited factor. This obligation does not depend
upon the agreement of the parties, and it is not waivable. 43 While an
employer may be able to avoid contractually imposed obligations, such
as an obligation not to fire without just cause, by pointing to a plain-
tiff's wrongdoing, the duty not to discriminate is statutorily, not con-
tractually, imposed." Thus, that misrepresentations may be a defense
v. Tompkins, 93 N.W. 901, 906-07 (Minn. 1903) (same holding). See Witus, supra note 2, who
urges this approach. See also Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 6, 16.
4°Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992); Massey v. Trump's
Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 325 (D.N.J. 1993). See Mesritz, supra note 2, at 218.
Materiality and reliance both are necessary elements for a claim of fraud. Walsh v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 656 F.2d 367, 369 (8th Cir. 1981). When a claim of fraudulent concealment, or failure
to disclose, is presented, a duty to disclose also must be established. ld. Whether applicants owe
a duty of disclosure to prospective employers is questionable, and in the after-acquired evidence
context, stretching the defense to encompass a failure to disclose unrequested information has
been rejected. DeVoe v. Medi-Dyn, 782 F, Supp. 546, 552-53 (1). Kan. 1992).
For misstatements, however, duty is not a necessary clement for the fraud claim, Stewart v.
Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1992), and the after-acquired evidence cases generally
involve active misrepresentations by applicants or employees,
Courts confronting after-acquired evidence defenses to employment discrimination claims,
regardless of the theory used in accepting the defense, have required that the plaintiff's wrong-
doing meet these tests of materiality and reliance to prevent "an employer from combing an
employee's file after a discriminatory termination to discover minor, trivial or technical infrac-
tions for use in a Summers defense." O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D. Utah
1990).
41 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1989); Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
42 But see ELKOURI & ELKOORI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1986) for a discussion of
how arbitrators handle after-acquired evidence in "just cause" cases arising under a collective
bargaining agreement See also United Paperworkers v. Misco, 484 U.S. 27, 29 (1987); Rubinstein,
supra note 2, at n.6, n.10.
45 In other words, a covered employer and employee could not agree, as an enforceable term
of their employment contract, that the employer was free to discriminate on the basis of race or
sex. Should discrimination occur, the employee could bring her Title VII claim, regardless of the
contract's terms. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 35.2
(2d ed. 1988). See also Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1990), which
permits waiver of accrued claims under the ADEA under the conditions established by the statute.
Waiver of future claims is not permitted.
44 Mmsay, 828 F. Supp. at 325; Bazzi v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 808 F. Supp. 1306,
1310 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
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to contractual liability is not dispositive on the question of statutory
liability. Whether statutory liability• exists is a question of statutory
construction, not of contract law."
An interesting twist on the contractual analysis was argued by
Judge Godbold in his dissent in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., a
case brought before the Eleventh Circuit.'" According to Judge God-
bold, a plaintiff who lies to get a job lacks standing to complain of
subsequent discrimination because she did not "properly come into
the status of employee."47 Because Title VII and other employment
discrimination statutes only proscribe discrimination in employment,
one who achieves her employment status through falsehoods is not an
"employee" for Title VII purposes, he reasoned, and thus cannot claim
to be "aggrieved" by the employer's wrongful conduct."
Under Title VII, however, the "term 'employee' means an individ-
ual employed by an employer."" Nothing in Tide VII states or suggests
that an individual who lied to get a job is not employed. Nor do other
laws make that distinction." The IRS, for example, would be unlikely
to agree with Judge Godbold that an individual who gained her em-
ployment through false pretenses is not employed. Instead, employ-
ment status under Title VII and other employment discrimination
statutes is determined either by employer control,'' by an "economic
realities" test," or by a "hybrid" form of these two. 53 These tests, and
The common law of contracts does not impose a duty not to discriminate. At common law,
an employer, absent an agreement to the contrary, is free to fire its employees for any reason it
pleases, even one "morally wrong." Payne v. Western & A.R.R. Co., 81 'Fenn. 507 (1884). Federal
law, through statutes such as Title VII, § 1981, the ADEA and the ADA, imposes the nondiscrimi-
nation obligation on employers without regard to any private agreement to the contrary.
45 See infra notes 57-146 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory construction
issue.
One could say that a duty to comply with employment discrimination statutes is a duty
implied into the employment contract. But that does not alter the inquiry. It is a statutory duly,
not a contractually assumed one, that is at issue in suits alleging violations of the statutes.
46 968 F.2d 1174, 1185 (11th Cir. 1992).
47 Id. at 1187.
48 Id. at 1188.
49 42 U.S.C. § 20000) (1988). The statute applies to discrimination that arises out of
employment and not to discrimination that occurs in other contexts.
so See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988) (ADEA). Professor Rubinstein, discussing after-acquired
evidence in worker's compensation cases, describes what has become known as "Larson's rule,"
which states that "employment obtained through false pretenses is nonetheless employment."
Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 21-22. •
53 See Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
82 SeeEEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984); Armbruster v. Quinn,
711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983).
53 See Cobb v, Sun Papers, hie., 673 F.2d 337, 341 (Ildi Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874
(1982).
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their variants, long have been used to determine whether an individual
is an employee.54 When a plaintiff performs services for an employer
under its direction and control, she is an employee, however wrong-
fully she may have gained that status. 55
Judge Godbold's reasoning, while couched in terms of standing,
essentially is directed toward whether a plaintiff who lied her way into
a job is really "aggrieved" when she thereafter is discriminated against.
This is but another way of asking whether such a plaintiff has been
injured or harmed by discriminatory conduct when the defendant can
show it would not have hired or would have fired the plaintiff had it
known of her wrongdoing. 56 Whether denominated as a question of
standing, causation or injury, the question remains the same: does Title
VII extend protection against discrimination when an employer would
have been justified in taking action against the plaintiff for nondis-
criminatory reasons, even though it took the action for discriminatory
ones? We explore the resolution of that question in Part C below.
54 See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (FLSA). Most of the questions of
employee status have involved distinguishing employees from independent contractors. For
general discussion of the various tests, see C. Sut.t.ivArr, Kr AL., supra note 43, § 1.2; Patricia
Daliton, Comment, The Definition of "Employee" Under Title VII: Distinguishing Between Employees
and Independent Contractors, 53 U. CINN, L. REV. 203, 207-16 (1984).
55 It is useful to compare the examples relied upon by Judge Godbold with the employee
wrongdoer in after-acquired evidence cases. According to judge Godbold, "fain employee who
had circumvented the hiring process and had her name placed on the payroll by a collaborator
or, worse yet, having had her name fraudulently entered on a 'padded' payroll, never reported
for work but received paychecks that were split between her and her collaborator," would not be
an employee for Title VII purposes. 968 F.2d 1174, 1188 (1992) (Godbold, J., dissenting). But his
examples involve persons who are not in fact performing services under the direction and control
and for the benefit of the covered employer. That persons whose names fraudulently appear on
a payroll and who perform no work are not employees is hardly a convincing argument for
excluding those who do work for the employer.
Moreover, Title VII, the statute at issue in Wallace, permits "individuals" to assert a cause of
action. As courts have reasoned, this encompasses persons who are not technically employees of
the employer in question but who have been aggrieved by discrimination affecting their employ-
ment opportunities. See Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 422 (7th Cir. 1986). As stated by
the court in Mitchell v. Tenney:
employee status is not necessarily the primary focus of, nor a threshold requirement
to maintaining, a Tide VII action. While an individual's status with an employer is
not unimportant, the focus must be on whether the defendant can subject him to
the type of acts Title VII was intended to prohibit.
650 F. Supp. 703, 707 (N.D. 111. 1986).
56 This is, for example, the way the Summers court, and most of its progeny, considered the
issue. See Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
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B. The McDonnell-Douglas Prima Facie Case
To establish a claim of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must prove
the defendant acted with an intent to discriminate. Because direct
evidence of discriminatory intent is often difficult to obtain, the Su-
preme Court in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green established a frame-
work by which plaintiffs can present a circumstantial case of intentional
discrimination, 57
 When a plaintiff claims, for example, that she was not
hired because of her race, she establishes a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation when she shows that she was in the protected class, was qualified
for the job, was not hired, and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants. 58
 The establishment of the prima facie case passes to the em-
ployer the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the failure to hire. 59
In after-acquired evidence cases, some courts, when confronted
with a plaintiff's misrepresentations or other misconduct, have found
the plaintiff not qualified for the position in question.'"' Upon finding
the plaintiff would thus be unable to make out a prima facie case using
the McDonnell-Douglas factors, these courts have then granted sum-
mary judgment to defendants.
This use of McDonnell-Douglas in the after-acquired evidence cases
reflects a misunderstanding of the purpose of the test. McDonnell-
Douglas is designed to provide plaintiffs a method of establishing intent
to discriminate. It is not an exclusive method of proof; even when a
plaintiff cannot satisfy the four prongs of McDonnell-Douglas, she still
can establish a prima facie case by presenting other evidence sufficient
to create an inference of discriminatory intent. 8 '
'i7 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. '228, 271 (1989)
(O'Connor, j., concurring).
58
 McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
59 /d.; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affiiirs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
Burdine clarified that the burden passing to the defendant is one of production. Id. at 255.
Plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion on the question of discriminatory intent. Id
at 253-54. See also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993).
80 See cases cited supra note 31. For example, if the job required a college degree and plaintiff
fraudulently claimed to have had one, she would riot be considered qualified for the job because
she lacked the requisite qualifications. See Witus, supra note 2, at 52.
51
 Notari v, Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1992).
The MeDonneltDouglas prima fade case, as the Supreme Court has explained, creates an
inference of discriminatory intent because through satisfying the test, the plaintiff has eliminated
the two most likely reasons for his rejection—the absence of a vacancy or a lack of qualifications.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v, United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977). But arm inference
of discriminatory intent can be established through other kinds of circumsian dal evidence, such
as differences in treatment of persons similarly situated. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa he Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281 (1976).
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In after-acquired evidence cases, however, the question is not
whether the employer's action was discriminatorily motivated. That
impermissible motive has been established, or at least assumed, for
purposes of the analysis. 62 Thus, the four-prong McDonnell-Douglas test,
used to establish a prima facie case, and designed to ferret out inten-
tional discrimination, has no role to play. Because employer intent has
been admitted, proven or assumed, a plaintiff's inability to make out
a circumstantial case of intentional discrimination using the McDon-
nell-Douglas factors is irrelevant. There is an intent to discriminate. The
question is whether it is actionable.
C. The "Mixed Motive" Analog))
The classic disparate treatment case presupposes a single motive
for an employer's decision, a motive that is either lawful or unlawful.°
But sometimes an employer is found to have acted out of several
motives, both lawful and unlawful. These cases have become known as
"mixed motive" cases. 64 When confronted with the after-acquired evi-
dence defense, most courts have been guided by the Supreme Court's
treatment of these mixed motive cases.°
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court considered whether a
defendant who acted from mixed motives could be liable under Title
VII.° The Court concluded that once the plaintiff shows the unlawful
motive was a substantial motivating factor in the employer's decision,
the burden of persuasion passes to the defendant to prove it would
have made the same decision even if it had not taken the unlawful
motive into account. 67 If the defendant carries this burden, it avoids
62 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
61/ McDonnzll-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, and Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, were both premised on
a single motive for the employer's decision.
54 See Weber, supra note 32, at 498-500, for a description of the mixed-motive concept.
Professor Weber notes the term "duplicative cause" accurately describes mixed-motive cases
"because two causes, either of which would alone cause the harm, operate simultaneously." Id.
at 499.
65 See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr., 968 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (11th Cir. 1992); Washington v.
Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1992); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 864 F.2d
700, 798 (10th Cir. 1988); Williams & Davis, supra note 2, at 1-3.
66 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989).
Ann Hopkins alleged she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex when she was
denied partnership by Price Waterhouse. Id. at 231. The trial court found Hopkins' sex had played
a role in the partnership decision but also credited the accounting firm's legitimate reason for
its decision—that Hopkins lacked interpersonal skills. 618 F. Stipp, 1109, 1113-14, 1119 (D.D.C.
1985).
67 490 U.S. at 251-53.
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liability.° The Price Waterhouse decision, foreshadowed by the Court's
earlier decisions in Mt. Healthy° and Transportation Management,'" thus
accepted a "but for" causation test for Title VII liability. 7 ' While the
Price Waterhouse plurality and dissent differed over who should bear
the burden of proving the presence or absence of "but for" causation,
i.e., of proving that but for discrimination, the adverse act would not
have occurred, all agreed it was a necessary element for liability:72
After-acquired evidence cases are not mixed motive cases." In
mixed motive cases, both lawful and unlawful reasons motivate the
employer's action; both are actually relied upon by the employer at the
time the decision is made. 71
 In after-acquired evidence cases, however,
it is the unlawful motive alone that actually was operating at the time
68 M. The trial court had ruled that an employer's demonstration that it would have made
the same decision anyway was relief, not liability, limiting. 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1120-21 (D.D.C.
1985). The court of appeals disagreed, holding that when a defendant can prove, through clear
and convincing evidence, that it would have made the same decision anyway, it avoids not only
relief but liability. 825 F.2d 458, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court of appeals held, however, that
the defendant did nut, in this case, carry such a burden. Id. at 472. The Supreme Court agreed,
but required the defendant to carry its burden only by a preponderance of the evidence, not a
clear and convincing, standard. 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989).
° 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977).
7°462 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1983).
71 Price Waterhouse was a plurality decision, and the plurality insisted it was rejecting a "but
for" approach to causation under Title VII. 490 U.S, at 240-41. But as Justice Kennedy correctly
points out in his dissent, the plurality endorsed a but for theory of causation by allowing the
employer to avoid liability by showing it would have made the same decision anyway. Id. at 281
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The disagreement between the plurality and dissent was over who
should bear the burden of proof. Id. at 287 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See Charles A. Sullivan,
Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 limant. L. lbw,
1107, 1126 n.67 (1991). The dissent would require the plaintiff' to retain the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the issue of but for causation, whereas the plurality, together with justices White
and O'Connor, approved shifting to the defendant the burden of proving an absence of but for
causation once the plaintiff shows the unlawful factor was a substantial motivating factor in the
employment decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
For discussion of Price Waterhouse's but for approach, sec Weber, supra note 32, at 501.
Professor Weber thinks the plurality's view of causation is correct and objects to the plurality's
permitting the employer to avoid liability when it would have made the same decision anyway.
Id, He believes the Court should have found causation and thus liability satisfied and should have
viewed the employer's "mixed motives" as relevant only to questions of remedy. See also Thomas
A. Eaton, Causation in Constitutional 'Torts, 67 IowA L. REV. 443, 454 (1982), who criticizes Mt.
Healthy as departing from common law but for concepts. According to Professor Eaton, causation
is established at common law whenever the wrongful act is a substantial factor in producing an
injury. Id.
72 See supra note 71.
"The EEOC correctly recognizes this distinction. EEOC's Office of General Counsel's
Advice Memorandum, 61 CCH EPD 1 5371 (1993). See also Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel &
Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 322 (D,NJ. 1993).
74 See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v, Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977);
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250; Williams & Davis, supra note 2, at 1-3.
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of the adverse action; the lawful "motive" is discovered after the fact.
Yet, because mixed motive cases endorse a "but for" causation model,
with its hypothetical inquiry into what would have happened if the
employer had not discriminated, they are seen as support for accep-
tance of the after-acquired evidence defense.Th If the employer can
show it would have been justified in making the same decision for
nondiscriminatory reasons, then the discrimination is not viewed as
causing the plaintiff any harm in an after-acquired evidence case. 76
At first glance, mixed motive cases, with their hypothetical "but-
for" constructs, do seem relevant. In mixed motive cases, employees
who have given their employers ample reason to fire them are not
shielded from the consequences of their wrongdoing because the
employer also considered their race or sex in making the employment
decision." When the employer shows it would have reached the same
result had it relied on the lawful factors alone, the discrimination is
not seen as causing any harm to the worker:78
 Similarly, in after-ac-
quired evidence cases, an employee whose wrongdoing is not discov-
75
"Mixed-motive" cases, of which Price Waterhouse u Hopkins is the latest, are analo-
gous to this case and therefore provide guidance in deciding which standard is
appropriate. In a mixed motive case, an employer has taken an adverse employment
decision against an employee in part because of a non-discriminatory reason. As in
a "resume fraud" case, the issue in a mixed motive case is whether the plaintiff has
actually been injured, and the court is required to undergo a hypothetical inquiry
as to what the company would have done under different circumstances ,
An after-acquired evidence case] is similar to the claim in Price Waterhouse that the
plaintiff would have been fired anyway, even assuming some discrimination oc-
curred. The same evidentiary framework is therefore appropriate. In situations
involving 'after acquired' evidence, the employer must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that, il' acting in a race-neutral manner, it would have made the
same employment decision had it known of the after-acquired evidence.
Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1992).
76
 See, e.g., id.; Reed v. Amax Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson v.
Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 1992); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988); O'Day v. McDonnell-Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F.
Supp. 1466, 1469 (D. Ariz. 1992).
" See, e.g., EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 1990).
75 This is the impact of Price Waterhouse. See supra notes 67--72 and accompanying text. Price
Waterhouse and its predecessor, Mt. Healthy, have been heavily criticized for permitting defen-
dants to avoid liability when they acted in part for discriminatory motives. See, e.g., Brodin, supra
note 35, at 311-23; Eaton, supra note 71, at 454-55; Weber, supra note 32, at 520; Zimmer &
Sullivan, The Structure of 7ttle VII Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation: Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, Inferences of Discrimination and Burdens of Proof 9 HAM!. WOMEN'S L. J. 25, 47-51
(1986), In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress responded to these criticisms by providing that
liability is established once plaintiff shows the unlawful factor was a motivating factor, even if,
lawful factors also motivated the decision. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107 (Nov. 21, 1991). For a
discussion of § 107 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, see infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
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ered until after her termination, but whose wrongdoing would have
led to her termination had it been discovered earlier, is viewed as
unharmed by the employer's discriminatory conduct.'''
A legal distinction, however, between motives actually operating
at the time of the adverse employment decision, and those which could
have, but did not, motivate the employer, has been long recognized in
employment discrimination doctrine." The Court endorsed this dis-
tinction in McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 81 its first individual disparate
treatment case. In McDonnell-Douglas, the plaintiff employee, Percival
Green, was not rehired following his participation in an unlawful
stall-in at his former employer's plant. Green claimed the failure to
rehire him was racially motivated. McDonnell-Douglas claimed it had
not rehired him because of his wrongdoing. 82 The Court proceeded to
lay out the burdens of proof in an individual disparate treatment case,
a tripartite allocation designed to determine whether the employer
had acted for the lawful reason, as it claimed, or for the unlawful
reason, as claimed by Green."
In McDonnell-Douglas, the Court accepted that Green had en-
gaged in wrongdoing against his employer and further accepted that
the wrongdoing would have justified a failure to rehire him, 84 None-
theless, it remanded for a determination of the reasons why the rehir-
ing decision in fact had been made." If it was done because of race,
McDonnell-Douglas was liable to Green, notwithstanding the existence
of lawful reasons that would have justified the adverse action if those
lawful reasons in fact did not motivate the employer."
7g See sources cited supra note 65.
80 The critical inquiry, the one commanded by the words of § 703(a) (1), is whether gender
was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was made." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989). As stated by one civil rights lawyer, criticizing the after-acquired evidence
doctrine, "the law is clear that courts are required to evaluate the employer's conduct as or when
the alleged discrimination occurred." Remarks of Joseph Sellers, quoted in "New Defense to Bias
Suit Attacks," supra note 2. See also EEOC Advice Memorandum, supra note 14.
Hi 411 U.S. 792, 803-04 (1973). See Brodin, supra note 35, at 307 n,69; Sullivan, supra note
71, at 1134-36.
" McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 (1973).
81
 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
84 "Respondent admittedly had taken part in a carefully planned 'stall in,' designed to tie up
access to and egress from petitioner's plant at a peak traffic hour. Nothing in Title V11 compels
an employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful activity
against it." 411 U.S. at 803,
85 1d. at 804.
86
While Title VII does not, without more, compel rehiring of respondent, neither
does it permit petitioner to use respondent's conduct as a pretext for the sort of
discrimination prohibited by § 703(a) (1). On remand, respondent must, as the
68	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:49
McDonnell-Douglas demonstrates that in resolving individual dis-
parate treatment claims, what is determinative is the factor actually
motivating the decision at issue. 87 That the plaintiff is a wrongdoer does
not relieve the employer from liability for its own discriminatory con-
duct." After all, Percival Green was regarded by the Court as a wrong-
doer. But the Court found that his wrongdoing did not justify denying
him relief if the employer in fact acted for discriminatory reasons.
Instead, the focus is on the employer's actual motivation in taking the
adverse action. If the employer acted for unlawful reasons, then it has
violated Title VII, even if other, lawful reasons, such as the plaintiffs
misconduct, would have justified the employment decision."
Court of Appeals recognized, be afforded a fair opportunity to show that peti-
tioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext .... In short,
on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were
in fact a covering for a racially discriminatory decision.
411 U.S. at 804-805. See also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188 (1989) (even
if individuals selected were better qualified than plaintiff, plain tiff could still recover if her race
motivated employer's decision).
87 Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1134-36. Professor Sullivan, who convincingly argues the above
point in reference to McDonnell-Douglas, also points out that in Price Waterhouse itself, the Court
accepted that the accounting firm would have been justified in refusing to make someone a
partner who had poor interpersonal skills. Id. at 1134. But if the firm would not in fact have
made the decision absent discrimination, then Title VII liability would attach. Id.
At least one court has recognized this distinction in the after-acquired evidence context. See
Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1225, 1227 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) ("McDonnell-Douglas, which sets forth the shifting burdens in a Title Vii case, clearly
presupposes a 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason known to the employer at the time of
discharge'"), in which the court found after-acquired evidence insufficient basis for summary
judgment. Summers itself conceded this point but found the after-acquired evidence nonetheless
dispositive. 864 F.2d 700, 705 (10th Cir. 1988).
88 See Weber, supra note 32, at 534. As Professor Weber notes, "{p]revailing conceptions of
morality do not excuse wrongful conduct on the ground that the victim is not meritorious,
innocent or vulnerable." Id. He explains that when an employer has engaged in intentional
discrimination:
lit has treated the victim as less than human. Its conduct, moreover, has reinforced
the powerlessness and coercion that women and minorities experience. just as
contributory negligence does not bar liability for intentional torts or fir wanton
and willful misconduct, the victim's job failings should not bar liability for inten-
tional discrimination.
Id. Professor Weber's remarks were directed toward the Price Waterhouse decision, which permit-
ted employers to avoid liability even though they engaged in intentional discrimination. But they
are equally applicable to after-acquired evidence cases.
89 Sex. supra notes 80-88. This focus on the actual motives operating at the time of the
employment decision is necessary to prevent defendant from avoiding liability too easily. As
commentators have recognized, "plausible justifications" for an employment decision can almost
always be found after the fact. SeeBrodin, supra note 35, at 321, quoting Thomas G.S. Christensen
& Andrea H. Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme
Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE U. 1269, 1322 (1968).
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But in after-acquired evidence cases, unlike in McDonnell
-
Douglas,
the plaintiff's wrongdoing is unknown to the defendant, frequently
because the plaintiff herself has concealed it. Thus, while the em-
ployer's motivation is based on an unlawful reason," it has been "de-
prived" of the opportunity to act out of mixed motives and thereafter
to avoid liability by demonstrating it would have made the same deci-
sion anyway. 9 ' Reliance on mixed motive cases, therefore, could be
viewed as an effort by the courts to place the employer in the situation
it would have been in had it known of plaintiff's wrongdoing.
The problem with this approach is that it expands the "but for"
causation analysis beyond the scope actually approved by the Supreme
Court.92 Although Price Waterhouse endorsed a "but for" approach to
causation in mixed motive cases,• it was careful to limit consideration
to the motives actually operating at the time of the adverse decision."
As the plurality observed:
[P]roving 'that the same decision would have been justified
. . . is not the same as proving that the same decision would
have been made.' An employer may not, in other words,
prevail in a mixed motive case by offering a legitimate and
96 Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1134-35. As stated earlier, some after-acquired evidence cases
involve a finding that the employment action was motivated by a discriminatory reason, see
Milliganiensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304-05 (6th Cir. 1992), whereas in others,
the unlawful animus is assumed for purposes of deciding the case, see Surniners v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988).
91
 It is not appropriate to assume the employer would have acted for the lawful reason alone
in the face of a finding or assumption that it in fact did act for unlawful reasons.
92 This point has not been lost on all lower courts. Some have correctly refused to follow
Summers on this basis. See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1178-79 (11th Or.
1992); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Stipp. 314, 322 (D.N.J. 1993); Moodie v.
Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 831 F. Supp. 333, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). See also EEOC Enforce-
ment Guidance, supra note 14.
93 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
94
 The plurality's emphasis on the factors operating at the time the decision was made could
not have been clearer. As it stated:
The critical inquiry, the one commanded by the words of 703(a) (1), is whether
gender was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was made. . . .
When, therefore, an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at the
time of' making a decision, that decision was "because of" sex and the other,
legitimate considerations—men if we may say later, in the context of litigation, that
the decision would have been the same if gender had not been taken into account.
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we
mean that, if we asked the employer at the tnoment of the decision what its reasons
were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the
applicant was a woman.
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sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not moti-
vate it at the time of the decision.9'
Thus, the "but for" causation approach approved in Price Water-
house focuses exclusively on the actual motive for the decision at issue. 96
Price Waterhouse does not relieve an employer from liability when it
could have acted for lawful reasons but in fact did not act for those
reasons. Mixed motive cases, like the pretext cases exemplified by
McDonnell-Douglas, regard liability for employment discrimination as
established if the unlawful motive actually caused the decision at the
time it was made. 97
 Accordingly, reliance on mixed motive analysis to
avoid liability in after-acquired evidence cases is incorrect. 98
That actual, not hypothetical, motivations are what matter for
liability in employment discrimination law perhaps can be better un-
derstood by considering the following example. Assume an employer
with a bias against women who resolves to fire a worker because of her
sex. Before the employer takes action for the discriminatory reason,
however, the woman shoots her supervisor and is fired for that reason
490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). See Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1134; Williams & Davis, supra note 2, at
3.
95 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256. See also id. at 261 (Whited., concurring) ("[W] here the
legitimate motive found would have been ample grounds for the action taken, and the employer
credibly testifies that the action would have been taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this
should be ample proof."). But see id. at 278 (O'Connor, .1„ concurring) (burden that shifts to
defendant is burden to show "that the decision would have been justified by other, wholly
legitimate considerations").
96 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. See aisoAmicus Curiae Brief of EEOC, O'Day
v. McDonnell-Douglas Helicopter Co., 92-15625 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing after-acquired evi-
dence is not relevant to liability because it did not motivate employer at time decision was made);
EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 14.
97 See, e.g., EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 1990).
98 Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1993); Wallace v. Dunn
Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1178-79 (11th Cir. 1992); Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y,
831 F. Supp. 333, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp.
314, 322 (D.Nj. 1993); Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 60 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1225, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). As the Seventh Circuit stated in Kristufek
A discriminatory firing must he decided solely with respect to the known circum-
stances leading to the discharge. The deterring statutory penalty is for retaliatory
firing, the character of which is not changed by some after discovered alternate
reason for the discharge which might otherwise have been used, but was not. The
after discovered alternate reason comes too late. That remains our view of the law.
985 F.2d at 369 (quoting Smith v. General Scanning, 876 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir. 1989)). See
also Williams & Davis, supra note 2, at 3, 7.
In Hussmann Foodservice, however, despite the language quoted above, it is unclear whether
the Seventh Circuit believed the after-acquired evidence was irrelevant to liability or whether the
jury had necessarily rejected defendant's claim that it would have fired plaintiff had it known of
resume falsifications. 985 F.2d at 370.
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alone. No liability under Title VII would exist, even though the em-
ployer harbored a bias, because the unlawful reason did not actually
motivate the discharge." While the employer had bad thoughts, Title
VII does not prohibit bad thoughts)" It only prohibits wrongfully
motivated acts)°' Thus, whatever an employer's subjective feelings may
be, it is only when it acts on those motives that liability will attach.
Conversely, when an employer does act for the unlawful reason, it
has violated the statute. Just as a court will not entertain a hypothetical
inquiry as to whether the employer might have discriminated had its
opportunity to do so not been preempted, it should not consider
whether the employer would have acted for lawful reasons had its
unlawful conduct not occurred. Actual, not hypothetical, motivation is
what matters, whether in a mixed motive or a pretext case.w 2
1. Nondeterminative Discrimination
Mixed motive cases, while focussing on actual motivation, do per-
mit an employer to avoid liability when its discriminatory motivation
was nondeterminative" or when the discrimination made no differ-
ence to the outcome of the employment decision)" Similarly, in after-
99 Cf. infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
1 °0
 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The legislative history
makes it clear that Congress was attempting to eradicate discriminatory actions in the employ-
ment setting, not mere discriminatory thoughts."). See 100 Cong. Rec. 7254 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Case). Sec also Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1123 n.64, who, while agreeing Congress did
not and constitutionally could not bar thoughts or their expression, says it could and did bar
"prejudice in action." Thus, discrimination that is not °laconic determinative can be prohibited
without Title VII becoming a "thought control" bill.
"Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1123 n.64.
102 Moreover, a "business justification" defense has never been accepted for claims of dispa-
rate treatment. Employers are not permitted to discriminate simply because they have good
business reasons for doing so. Los Angeles v, Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1983); Phillips v,
Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum, 7271:2d 473, 477-78
(5th Cir. 1984),
Section 105(2) of the 1991 CRA spells this out, providing that "a demonstration that an
employment practice is required by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a
claim of intentional discrimination." Pub, L. No. 102-166, § 105 (Nov. 21, 1992).
The after-acquired evidence defense smacks of a "business necessity" approach. While the
employer has discriminated, it argues that good business reasons for the eMployment decision
now somehow should excuse the employer's wrongdoing. Since these are disparate treatment,
not impact, cases, arguments about good business reasons for discrimination should be given no
credence.
103 The term "nondeterminative discrimination" comes from Sam Stonefield, Non-Determina-
tive Discrimination, Mixed Motives, and the Inner Boundary of Discrimination Law, 3 BUFF. L. REv.
85, 89-93 (1986).
104 In the Mt. Wealthy case, for example, the Sixth Circuit concluded, on remand from the
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acquired evidence cases, courts have reasoned that the discrimination
was nondeterminative because the injury would have occurred had the
employer known of the plaintiff's wrongdoing.m Thus, the discrimina-
tion is viewed as not causing any injury to the plaintiff.' 06
The difference between a mixed motive case, in which a defen-
dant could successfully avoid liability under Price Waterhouse, and an
after-acquired evidence case is that in an after-acquired evidence case,
the discrimination was determinative. 107
 In a mixed motive case, the
employer demonstrates that the same event would have happened at
the same time even had it not discriminated, whereas in an after-ac-
quired evidence case no such showing is possible. The employer's
wrongfully motivated act preempted its opportunity to act for lawful
reasons.
Supreme Court, that Doyle would have been fired for the lawful reasons alone, even if his
protected speech had not been taken into account. 670 F.2d at 61.
"The courts, however, have required the defendant to prove it would have taken the action
had it known of plaintiff's wrongdoing. Thus, evidence of a policy of discharging employees for
dishonesty, coupled with sworn testimony from the employer that it would have acted on the
evidence had it been aware of it, has been required. As stated by the court in Reed v. Amax Coal
Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1992), "[Wle must require similar proof to prevent employers
from avoiding Title VII liability by pointing to minor rule violations which may technically subject
the employee to dismissal but would not, in fact, result in discharge."
When disputed issues of fact exist over whether the plaintiff engaged in the wrongdoing or
whether defendant really would have acted on the wrongdoing, summary judgment has been
denied. See, e.g., id. at 1298-99 (summary judgment granted on other grounds); Punahele v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 487, 489 (D. Colo. 1991); Flesner v. Technical Communica-
tions Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107, 1110 (Mass. 1991).
Also, some courts have recognized that when the claim is one for discriminatory firing, the
defendant cannot prevail on an after-acquired evidence defense by showing it would riot have
hired the plaintiff. It must show it would have fired him. As noted by the Seventh Circuit in
Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1992), an employer who may not have
hired an employee had it known of his resume fraud may not have fired him upon discovering
the fraud if' he was performing the job successfillly. See also Baab v. AMR Services Corp., 811 F.
Supp. 1246, 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1106
(D. Colo. 1992).
106 See, e.g., Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304-05 (6th Cir. 1992)
("This court, in Johnson, adopted the view that, if the plaintiff would not have been hired, or
would have been fired, if the employer had known of the falsification, the plaintiff suffered no
legal damage by being fired.").
107
 The Eleventh Circuit recognizes this distinction, viewing Summers as inconsistent with the
Mt. Healthy rule "that the plaintiff should be left in no worse a position than if she had not been
a member of a protected class or engaged in protected opposition to an unlawful employment
practice." Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 1992). See also Massey v.
Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D.N.J. 1993); but see Paul J. Gudel, Beyond
Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the. Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination
Law, 70'17:x. L. Rev. 17, 97 n.31 I (1991), who finds the after-acquired evidence cases "only make
sense on a pure but for' theory." He criticizes the cases, however, as inconsistent with the policy
bases of Title VII.
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As Professor Richard Wright has observed, in discussing causation
theory in tort law, actual causation necessarily is present in what he
describes as cases of "preemptive causation." 1 °8
 These "preemptive cau-
sation" cases, a category into which after-acquired evidence cases neatly
fit, are those where events that would have been sufficient to cause the
injury are preempted by the defendant's wrongful act.'"° In such cases,
the wrongful act "clearly was a cause of the injury, since it was a
necessary element of the set of actual antecedent conditions that was
sufficient for the injury." "° Other actions that may well have occurred,
but in fact did not, are not properly deemed a cause of the injury
but instead are merely preempted potential causes."' The preemptive
wrongful act caused the loss, while the second, preempted, act did not.
In contrast, in a mixed motive case where the defendant prevails,
the wrongful motive was not a necessary causal element. 12 Rather, the
employer demonstrates that the discrimination, while it occurred, in
fact did not cause the loss in the "but for" sense. The "but for" test,
endorsed in Price Waterhouse, focuses on the motivations actually oper-
ating at the time of the adverse decision, and regards an act as a cause
of an injury "if and only if, but for the act, the injury would not have
occurred."" 3
 Because the injury would have occurred anyway, the dis-
crimination is nondeterminative.
1 °8 Richard Wright, Causation in 'Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1775 (1985).
It'9 Professor Wright supplies the following example: "D shoots and kills P just as P was about
to drink a cup of tea that was poisoned by C." D's shot is the preemptive cause, and the poisoning
is not a cause "because its potential effects were preempted." Id. at 1175-76.
For our purposes, the discriminatory motive is the shot and the after-acquired evidence is
the poison. While the after-acquired evidence would have caused the termination, the discrimi-
nation preempted it from doing so.
11 °/d. at 1794-95. See also Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine
Cause in Fact, 46 Ti x. L. REv. 423 (1968).
I" Wright, supra note 108, at 1795, 1798.
112 Professor Wright terms these cases of "duplicative causation," where more than one cause
actually was present. Id. at 1776. As he explains:
The key to the overdetermined causation cases, therefore, is the distinction between
duplicative and preemptive causation. In each case, an empirical judgment must
be made: was the tortious aspect of the defendant's conduct a necessary element
in a set of actual antecedent conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of
the injury .
IrL at 1796 (emphasis added),
113
 Id. at 1775. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989). Professor Gudel
criticizes Price Waterhouse's adoption of a "but for" approach to liability. He would impose liability
even in cases of nondeterminative discrimination, because "if discriminatory acts are to be illegal,
there should be a penalty for committing them even if the same result would have been [reached
absent the discrimination.] " Gudel, supra rote 107, at 97-99; see also Eaton, supra note 71, at
455; Stonefield, supra note 103, at 134.
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But it is only nondeterminative discrimination that avoids liability
under Price Waterhouse. 114 In preemptive causation cases, the discrimi-
nation is determinative. It did actually cause the firing, or the failure
to hire, even if that event otherwise would have occurred once the
defendant discovered the wrongdoing. Moreover, the defendant might
never have discovered the plaintiffs wrongdoing, absent the defen-
dant's discrimination and the resulting litigation, 115 further reinforcing
the determinative nature of the defendant's discrimination.
2. Existence of an Injury
In some after-acquired evidence cases, the courts have conceded
the existence of causation."' But they have denied liability on the
theory that when the harm would have occurred even if there had
been , no discrimination, there is no "injury" and thus no claim."' This
raises the question of what an "injury" is for purposes of federal
employment discrimination statutes.
114
 In other words, if the discrimination did make a difference, defendant loses. If the lawful
reasons standing alone would not have caused the employer to do what it did, the discrimination
was determinative.
See Weber, supra note 32, at 508, who criticizes Price Waterhouse for departing from tort taw
liability concepts. According to Professor Weber, in intentional tort cases, full liability is imposed
when the unlawful motive is the dominant one. See also Eaton, supra note 71, at 454-56.
115 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
IIS That is, these courts concede the discrimination was the actual cause for the employer's
act. The Summers court, itself, recognized causation was present 864 F.2d at 708. Professor
Wright's point is to force recognition that causation is present in preemptive causation cases. The
issue of liability, he says, is not a causal one. Wright, supra note 108, at 1798-99.
117 See, e.g., Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1992); Reed v. Amax
Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1992); Summers, 864 F.2d at 708; Russell v. Microdyne
Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305, 308 (ED, Va. 1993); O'Day v. McDonnell-Douglas Helicopter Co., 784
F. Supp. 1466, 1469 (D. Ariz. 1992); Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 487, 490 (D.
Colo. 1991); Grzenia v. Interspec., Inc., 1991 WL 222105 *2 (N.D. III. 1991). As Professor Weber
also observes, "most commentators have analyzed Mt. Healthy not as a case lacking proof of
causation but as a case in which the Court applied remedial policy ideas to limit relief that
otherwise would be justified by the harm the defendant actually caused." Weber, supra note 32,
at 524 n.221.
Professor Wright agrees that for "preemptive causation" cases, the question is not one of
causation but of damages, which brings issues of policy into play. In tort cases, he would approve
a no liability finding when the preemptive condition was nontortious. See Wright, supra note 108,
at 1798-1801. See also James A. Henderson, Jr., A Defense of the Use of the Hypothetical Case to
Resolve the Causation Issue—The Need for an Expanded, Rather than a Contracted Analysis, 47 TF.X.
L. REV. 183, 201-12 (1969). Whether the policies of employment discrimination law support
absolving from liability a defendant who has acted out of unlawful motives is explored below.
Professor Brodin, supra note 36, at 311-23, views causation issues as policy questions in
disguise. He urges an expansive view of causation under Title VII because of its societal goal of
deterring behavior, not simply compensating the victim.
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One form of injury is the adverse employment decision itself.
When an individual is fired, she is injured economically." 8 It is this
form of injury upon which most courts focus in after-acquired evidence
cases. Courts reason that a termination that is fully justifiable on lawful
grounds is not an injury at all." 9 This argument has some appeal in
cases of nondeterminative discrimination. Although discrimination oc-
curred, it did not result in any tangible detriment or the loss of any
benefit,'" But when the discrimination is determinative, as it is in
after-acquired evidence cases,' 2 ' the discrimination does result in a
tangible loss. While the employee presumably would have been fired
upon the employer's discovery of her wrongdoing, the fact remains
that she was fired when she was fired because of her sex or race.' 22 Thus,
she at least suffers an economic loss for the time period between the
unlawful discrimination and the employer's discovery of the wrongdo-
ing. 123
Moreover, an injury occurs whenever an employee is the victim of
discrimination, even when that discrimination is nondeterminative.
When an employee is treated differently because of her protected
status, that is an injury to her self-esteem and to her dignity.
lisShe loses, for example, the salary and benefits she was receiving from her job.
119 See cases cited supra note 116.
r2°Mixed motive cases, in which the employer carries its burden of persuasion, fit into this
category. The plaintiff is placed in no better or worse position, economically speaking, than lie
would have been in absent the discrimination. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. lid, of Etic. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977). Title VII, however, has goals beyond mere victim cornpensa-
don, as the critics of Mt. Healthy have convincingly pointed out. See, e.g., Brodin, supra note 35,
at 317-18. Professor Brodin argues that denying liability in cases of nondeterminative discrimi-
nation gives discriminators no incentive to change their conduct. "Indeed, the refusal of the
court to take some action against such 'harmless' discrimination might actually encourage the
continuation of such conduct." hi at 318.
121 See supra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
t22 Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognizing discrimi-
nation deprived plaintiff of employment for period of time, even if employer would have fired
her after learning of her wrongdoing); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 E Stipp,
314, 322-23 (D.N. 1993) (same).
123 7d. There are after-acquired evidence cases, however, in which the discrimination, while
determinative, results in no out-of-pocket loss. In Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 728 F.2d 614,
615 (4th Cir. 1984), for example, plaintiff was denied employment under defendant's policy of
refusing to consider anyone over a certain age for employment. Id. The court rejected the airline's
BFOQ defense, and an ADEA violation was established. Id. at 623. On remand, however, it was
established that plaintiff would not have been hired anyway due to misappropriation of funds
while working for another airline. Id. at 626-27. Under these circumstances, the court denied
plaintiff any backpay or instatement. Id. at 626.
This result is correct. What plaintiff was deprived of when the employer rellised to consider
him because of his age was a chance to be considered further. By requiring the further consid-
eration, plaintiff received all the equitable relief to which he was entitled. See also East Texas
Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 n.9 (1977); Murnarte v. American Airlines,
124 That
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the discrimination may result in no out-of-pocket loss makes it no less
painful an affront. 125 In Price Waterhouse, the Court chose to subordi-
nate this latter form of injury to the employer's managerial interests,
essentially regarding the harms of nondeterminative discrimination as
not actionable under Title VII.' 26 The Court's recent decision in United
States u Burke, at first glance, echoes this approach.' 27 Although recog-
nizing that discrimination causes "grave harm" to its victims, the Court
found that Title VII was not aimed at redressing "tort-like personal
injuries," given the statute's remedial focus on economic harm.' 28
Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). For discussion of this
point, see Stonefield, supra note 103, at 134-36; EEOC's Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 8.
t24 Justice O'Connor so recognizes in her concurrence in Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a full elaboration of this point, see Brodin, supra note
35, at 318-20; Weber, supra note 32, at 531-34; Note, An Evaluation of the Proper Standard of
Causation in the Dual Motive Title VII Context: A Rejection of the 'Same Decision' Standard, 35
DRAKE L. REV. 209, 221 -22 (1985-86); Comment, Bibbs v. Block: Standard of Causation and
Burden of Proof in Individual Disparate Treatment Action Under Title VII, 42 WAsn. & LEE L. REV.
1439, 1447-48 (1985). As Professor Stonefield points out, emotional harm generally will be the
"most significant injury" in cases of nondeterminative discrimination. Stonefield, supra note 103,
at 125.
The EEOC agrees with these commentators, In its amicus brief to the Ninth Circuit in O'Day
v. McDonnell-Douglas Helicopters, the agency stated, "[I]rom the Commission's perspective, the
most troubling aspect of the Summers decision is the Court's suggestion that a victim of unlawful
discrimination has suffered no 'injury' when he was engaged in conduct that would justify his
rejection or termination." The public interest has been injured, says the EEOC, and "discrimina-
tion suits vindicate more than the economic interests of the individual victim."
125 See sources cited supra note 124.
Some courts, considering an after-acquired evidence defense to state law civil rights claims
or claims of emotional distress, have found the availability of compensatory or punitive damages
a sufficient basis for refusing to apply the defense. The existence of these damages, they say,
makes clear a compensable injury exists. See, e.g., Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246,
1262 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Bazzi v. Western & Southern Life Iris. Co., 808 F. Supp. 1306, 1310 (E.D.
Mich. 1992).
Such damages are available under § 1981, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act makes compensatory
and punitive damages now recoverable under Title VII and the ADA. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102
(Nov. 21, 1991).
126 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (weighing employer's managerial freedom against employee's
right to gender neutral decision).
127 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1873-74 (1992).
128 /d. at 1874. At issue in Burke was whether backpay awards under Title VII were taxable as
income. The Court held that they were. Id. at 1874. Whether backpay awards are taxable after
the 1991 Civil Rights Act is a question the Court did not resolve. It noted, however, that Congress's
addition of compensatory and punitive damages, as well as jury trials, as part of Title VII's
remedial scheme, "signals a marked change in its conception of the injury redressable by Tide
VII . ." Id. at 1874 n.12.
The dissent took issue with this characterization, finding the addition of compensatory and
punitive damages did not change the nature of the injury but merely provided additional
remedies for that injury. Id. at 1878 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). That the statute has separate
provisions on liability and remedy supports the dissent's point. SeeZimmer & Sullivan, supra note
78, at 48.
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Burke, however, rejected application of tort-like principles to Title
VII claims. 12" The Court recognized that in tort law, it is the right to
damages that makes a wrong a tort.'" By refusing to regard a Title VII
claim as a tort-like personal injury, the Court presumably also was
rejecting the application of a right to damages as an essential element
of a Title VII claim. Indeed, that no such element is required is
supported by the Court's decisions in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., in which the Court held that hostile
work environment sexual harassment claims were actionable under
Title VII, notwithstanding the absence of any tangible economic detri-
ment or psychological injury. 13 '
In any event, after-acquired evidence cases do not involve nonde-
terminative discrimination; a tangible out-of-pocket injury usually has
occurred.'" Moreover, as we discuss below, Congress now has amended
Title VII to make clear that nondeterminative discrimination is action-
able, recognizing that even when discrimination made no difference
to the outcome of the employment decision, liability for the discrimi-
nation nonetheless should be imposed.'"
D. The 1991 Civil Rights Act
Largely in response to a series of 1989 Supreme Court decisions,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991.' 34
 One of the decisions
affected by the Act was Price Waterhouse.
129 Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1827,1873 (1992).
"* Id. at 1871. See also Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE
L. REV. 1235,1251 (1988).
131
 Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67-68. See Gudel, supra note 107, at 96-101,
who argues that Title VII is not a tort action but a statute that prohibits certain acts. Accordingly,
he says, use of tort law's "but for" model is inappropriate. Id. at 97. Professor Gudel advocates
analyzing all disparate treatment cases' as sexual harassment cases are analyzed, focusing on
whether a person has been treated differently because of her sex, without regard to motive or
the presence of make-whole relief. Id. at 95. See also Belton, supra note 130, at 1242.
132
 See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
133 See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text, Whether these amendments apply retro-
actively is a question the Supreme Court has agreed to consider during its upcoming term.
Landgra.f v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427,432-33 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted in part, 113 S. Ct.
1250 (1993); Harris v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490,495-97 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted
in part, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993).
111 "The purposes of this Act are .
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment
in the workplace . .
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant
civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination."
Pub. L. No, 102-166, § 3 (Nov. 21,1991),
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Section 107 of the 1991 Act provides that "an unlawful employ-
ment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates
that race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice.""6 Liability thus attaches when an employment decision
is motivated even in part by an unlawful motive and even when the
employer can show it would have made the same decision anyway." 6
Congress thus has rejected a "but for" causation approach to Title VII
liability. Causation still is required in the sense that the unlawful factor
must have been a motivating factor for the adverse decision; bad
thoughts alone remain outside the statute's prohibitions.'" But causa-
tion is satisfied whenever the employer permits the unlawful factor to
play a role in its employment decisions and even when the discrimina-
tion is nondeterminative.'" While liability attaches when the unlawful
factor is a motivating one, section 107 does permit a limitation of
remedies when the employer can show "it would have taken the same
action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor."'" The
"but for" analysis endorsed by Price Waterhouse thus is removed from
the liability stage of the litigation and placed in the remedial stage.
Section 107 only amends Title VII, and not other employment
discrimination statutes, such as the ADEA, section 1981 and the ADA.
Whether the courts will continue to follow a Price Waterhouse approach
to liability under these statutes is unclear. 140 But as set forth above, that
analysis does not support denying liability in after-acquired evidence
"5 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107 (Nov. 21, 1991).
151I Not only the language but the legislative history make clear Congress's intent to reject
Price Waterhouse's "but for" approach to liability. See 137 CONG. Rec. H3935, H3948 (daily ed.
June 5, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. H4432 (daily ed. June 12, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. H9529 (daily
ed. Sept. 7, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. I-19532 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. 515235, (daily
ed. Oct 25, 1991); 137 GONG, REC. 515468, 515242 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
157 See Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1139-45. For a criticism of § 107, see Paul A. Cox, A Defense
of "Necessary Cause" in Individual Disparate. Treatment Theory, 11 ST. Louts U. Pun. L. REV. 29
(1992). See also Gudel, supra note 107, at 69, who regards § 107 as a "disaster" because it will
provide liability for cases of "nondcterminative discrimination" where plaintiff actually was hired
for the position in question and because it injects a "motivating factor" analysis into Title VII.
I3M Professor Gudel believes the focus on motivation should be dropped in favor of a focus
on the character of the act. He advocates focusing on whether the plaintiff has been treated
differently because of her race or sex, rather than focusing on the defendant's intent or motive.
Gudel, supra note 107, at 70.
139 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107 (Nov. 21, 1991). For a discussion of this aspect of § 107, see
infra notes 179-92 and accompanying text. See also Brodin, supra note 36, at 312-22, 320 n.16,
who advocated the approach to causation Congress enacted in the 1991 Civil Rights Act
140 Prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Price Waterhouse was applied to cases arising under the
ADEA. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins, Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1992).
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cases.' 4 ' And for Title VII cases, section 107 confirms that liability exists
when an employer in fact acts, even in part, out of unlawful motives.' 42
The EEOC so reads the amended statute. In its Enforcement
Guidance on disparate treatment cases, the EEOC addresses the 1991
Act's impact on after-acquired evidence cases and correctly concludes
that liability is present when the employer in fact acts for unlawful
reasons, regardless of whether it later discovers reasons that would have
justified the act.'° Because the EEOC is the agency responsible for
administering Title VII, its determination should be given some meas-
ure of deference by reviewing courts, even though its position is re-
flected only in a "policy guidance," and not in a rule,'" and even if the
EEOC is not entitled to the full measure of deference accorded to
agencies with rulemaking or adjudicative power. 14'' Its position on li-
ability in after-acquired evidence cases, a position fully supported by
the case law and the statute, 146 before and after its amendment, merits
respect from the courts.
In summary, after-acquired evidence is not liability limiting. When
an employer acts for discriminatory reasons, it has violated the law.
Does a liability determination, however, necessarily entitle a plaintiff
in an after-acquired evidence case to the full panoply of remedies that
would otherwise be available? We turn now to this question.
141 See supra notes 57-133 and accompanying text.
142 The lower courts have recognized that § 107 undercuts the Summers rationale. See Wallace
v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 1992); Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d
250, 255 n.4 (7th Cir. 1992); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Stipp. 314, 323
(D.N.j. 1993). But see Williams & Davis, supra note 2, at 8-9, who predict that courts will continue
to accept the after-acquired evidence defense despite § 107.
143 EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 14. The EEOC asserts that for a defendant to
avoid relief under § 107, the legitimate motives "must have been operating at the time of the
decision." Id. at 20. Thus, after-acquired evidence will not allow an employer to avoid damages
under § 107. The Guidance, moreover, expressly disavows the Summers approach to after-acquired
evidence.
144 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71 (1986); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971), But see Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Stipp. 305, 308 (E.D. Va. 1993).
145 Under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., an agency's construc-
tion of its enabling act is entitled to deference from the courts whenever the statute is silent or
ambiguous, 407 U.S. 837, 833-34 (1984). While agencies that have been confided adjudicative
or rulemaking authority may be the only ones entitled to a hill measure of Chemon deference,
see Cass R. Stinstein, Law and Administration riflerChevron, 90 Comm. L. REv. 2071, 2094 (1990),
even agencies lacking such power are still entitled to some measure of deference, Colin S. Diver,
Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. Ray. 549, 593-94 (1982). The
Supreme Court, moreover, has recognized the EEOC's interpretations of Title VII are entitled to
deference, notwithstanding the EEOC's lack of enfbrcement power. See sources cited supra note
144.
146 See supra notes 57-133 and accompanying text.
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III. REMEDIES IN AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE CASES
A plaintiff who establishes an employer's liability in an after-ac-
quired evidence case can be expected to contend that her wrongdoing
should have no effect on the potential remedy. When the wrongdoing
undoubtedly would have been discovered in the absence of discrimi-
nation, it is easy to reject this contention. But an argument for full
remedies has considerable appeal in cases in which the employee's
misconduct has been discovered only in the process of litigation on
her employment discrimination claim. However, it ultimately must be
rejected in these cases as well. If an employer establishes that it would
have discharged the plaintiff on the basis of the after-acquired evi-
dence, the employer should be permitted to treat the plaintiff's em-
ployment as at an end from the point at which the employer actu-
ally discovers the evidence. The plaintiff's backpay award, therefore,
should terminate at this point and the plaintiff should be denied
reinstatement. Compensatory and punitive damages, however, where
otherwise available under the applicable statute, should remain recov-
erable.
A. Backpay and Reinstatement
I. Wrongdoing Discovered Independent of the Litigation
While a backpay and reinstatement award is neither mandatory
nor automatic, 147 a plaintiff generally is entitled to "make whole" relief
that places her "as near as may be, in the situation Es] he would have
occupied if the wrong had not been committed."'" In most cases, this
"make whole" relief results in an award of full backpay to the time of
judgment and reinstatement.'" In after-acquired evidence cases, how-
ever, a plaintiff is made whole, in an equitable relief sense, by an award
of backpay that ends at the point of the employer's discovery of the
plaintiff's wrongdoing, provided the employer can prove the wrongdo-
ing would have resulted in termination under the employer's person-
nel policies.' 50 This is particularly apparent in cases in which plaintiff's
wrongdoing was discovered independent of the litigation.
147 Albernarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
148 Id. at 418.
145 Id. at 421; Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976); see Belton, supra note
130, at 1258; SULLIVAN, ZIMMER 8c RICHARDS, supra note 43, § 14.4.3. See generally ROBERT
BELION, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1992) (excellent discussion of' reme-
dial issues).
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The reason for denying full backpay and reinstatement in an
after-acquired evidence case is straightforward. An employer is free to
apply its personnel policies so long as it applies those policies in a
nondiscriminatory way.r" A prevailing plaintiff in an employment dis-
crimination action, like any other employee, should remain subject to
nondiscriminatory discipline, up to and including discharge, for vio-
lating the employer's policies. An employer who establishes that after-
acquired evidence is discharge-generating under its policies should be
permitted to treat the employment relationship (and thus backpay) as
at an end at the earliest point consistent with the principles underlying
employment discrimination law. 152
 That point is neither earlier nor
15°
 In determining the ending point fora backpay award in employment discrimination cases
generally, the lower courts, following the Supreme Court's lead, have engaged in a hypothetical
reconstruction of "the conditions and relationships that would have [existed] had there been no
`unlawful discrimination.'" Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 371-72 (1977); see Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764, 769 (1976) (discussing make whole objective of backpay
and remedies). Thus, when the employer can show the employee's job would have been elimi-
nated, see, e.g., Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1983), or the employee would
have been terminated, see, e.g., George v. Farmers Elec. Coop., Inc., 715 E2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.
1983), for nondiscriminatory reasons, backpay ends at that point, as does a right to reinstatement.
Behon„supra note 149, §§ 7.3, 9.26 (1992). From time to time, moreover, employee misconduct
has served as a bar to reinstatement. Irl. § 7.35.
While such hypothetical reconstructions are not appropriate at the liability stage, they are
appropriate at the remedial stage in determining questions of "snake whole" relief. For example,
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 limits the availability of Title VII remedies based on the hypothetical
question of what the employer would have done in the absence of a discriminatory motive. Civil
Rights Act of 1991, § 107 (adopting "but for" test in mixed motive cases to limit Title VII remedies,
but not Title VII liability). Section 107 is consistent with the approach taken in Franks and
Teamsters. For a discussion of the relevance of § 107 in after-acquired evidence cases, see infra
notes 179-91 and accompanying text (arguing Congress did not intend for courts to apply
particular remedial limitations of § 107 in such cases).
151 Employment discrimination statutes prohibit discrimination, They do not otherwise in-
terfere with managerial prerogatives. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2c1 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); see also § 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2)(A) ("No
order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual ... or the
payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was ... refused employment or suspended or
discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account or race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin or in violation of § 704(a)."). But see Alfred W. Blutnrosen, Strangers No More: All
Workers Are Entitled to 'Just Cause' Protection Under Title VII, 2 Imo. REL. L. J. 519 (1978).
Section 706(g), however, does not support a iota/denial of backpay in after-acquired evidence
cases. The plaintiff was fired for a discriminatory reason, and actual victims of discrimination
remain entitled to relief. Section 706(g) "merely preserves the employer's defense that the
nuts discharge, or nonpromotion of an individual claimant] wits for a cause other than
discrimination." Belton, supra note 130, at 1303 (quoting EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556
12.2d 167, 176 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978)). At the same time, § 706(g) does
support the termination of backpay from the point of discovery of the employee's wrongdoing
and a denial of reinstatement when the employer can show it would have taken the action on
nondiscriminatory grounds. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
152 Cf. note 151 supra (citing sources).
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later than the actual discovery of the evidence of employee wrongdo-
ing. To allow the employer the benefit of the evidence as of some
earlier point, as most lower courts have done in the after-acquired
evidence cases, is to give a safe harbor to discrimination. To award full
backpay and reinstatement is to give a windfall to the plaintiff and to
interfere unjustifiably with the character of the employment relation-
ship.'"
In a recent article critical of the Supreme Court's Price Waterhouse
decision, Professor Mark Weber argues that plaintiffs in mixed motive
cases deserve full backpay and reinstatement, unless they are incapable
of performing the work.'" Professor Weber's reasoning, which he pre-
sumably would apply as well with respect to after-acquired evidence
cases, is quite simple. The employer's unlawful discrimination caused
harm. The harm was the plaintiffs discharge. The plaintiff deserves
compensation for the harm. The imperative of compensation requires
reversal of the discharge, i.e., full backpay and reinstatement.'"
Professor Weber's argument should be rejected, as it has been
rejected by Congress in the mixed motive context,' 56 because it fails to
take into account the competing principle that even a prevailing plain-
tiff in an employment discrimination case should remain subject to the
employer's legitimate managerial discretion. The "harm" done by em-
ployment discrimination cannot be defined in the abstract but takes
its shape from its context, and its context includes the employer's right
to discipline or discharge employees for lawful reasons.
Professor Weber also argues for full remedies in employment
discrimination cases, even "when the harm would have happened
'-''This is the approach advocated by the EEOC. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying
text. It is also the approach currently being followed by the NLRB in after-acquired evidence
cases. See John Cuneo, Inc., 298 NLRB No. 125, at 861 (1990): supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
In a recent case arising under the National Labor Relations Act, however, the NLRB ordered
reinstatement and full backpay to an employee discriminated against because of protected
activities, despite an Administrative Law .ludge's finding that the employee had lied on the witness
stand during the NLRB proceedings. The Board's order was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. NLRB
v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 982 F.2d 441,445-46 (10th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari to consider the following issue: "Does employee forfeit remedy of reinstatement with
backpay after administrative law judge finds that he purposefully testified falsely during admin-
istrative hearing?" ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB 113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993).
154 Weber, supra note 32, at 524-39. But see Brodin, supra note 36, at 324, who argues that
when an employer can show it would have made the same decision anyway, backpay and rein-
statement to the plaintiff should be denied.
155 Weber, supra note 32, at 524-25.
156 See infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text (discussing § 107 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991).
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anyway," 157 because imposing full remedies "enhances the deterrent
effect of the antidiscrimination laws"'" and "vindicate [s] the commu-
nity's moral standards."'" In an after-acquired evidence case, however,
these objectives are sufficiently addressed through the remedies that
remain available to a plaintiff even if an employer can establish the
after-acquired evidence defense to full backpay and reinstatement.'"
There is no reason, therefore, to overcompensate the plaintiff or to
prevent the employer from enforcing nondiscriminatory personnel
policies in order to serve these objectives.
2. Wrongdoing Discovered as a Result of the Litigation
To what extent, however, does the above hold true when the
evidence of plaintiff's wrongdoing is a "fruit" of the discrimination,
i.e., when it is uncovered through discovery on the discrimination
claim? This is the most difficult problem posed by after-acquired evi-
dence.
In Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.,' 6 ' the Eleventh Circuit gener-
ally embraced the proposition that a plaintiff in an after-acquired
evidence case should be entitled to prevail on liability but should be
denied some forms of relief otherwise available for employment dis-
crimination: "[I]f [the employer] now has a legitimate motive that
would cause [the plaintiffs] discharge, then reinstatement or front pay
would go beyond making [the plaintiff] whole and would unduly
trammel [the employer's] freedom to lawfully discharge employees. "162
The Wallace majority, however, disagreed with the idea that the plain-
tiff's right to backpay automatically should terminate at the point when
the employer actually acquires discharge-generating evidence.'"
In the view of the Wallace majority, an employer who never would
have discovered the discharge-generating evidence if the plaintiff had
not sued for employment discrimination should not be entitled to take
advantage of the evidence to cut off the plaintiff's right to full back-
pay.'" To award less than full backpay under these circumstances,
according to the Wallace majority, would, in a sense, punish the plain-
t•57 Weber, supra note 32, at. 531.
58 Id.; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,417-18 (1975).
159 Weber, supra note 32, at. 533.
tso See infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text (discussing hirther remedies that remain
available).
161 968 F.2(1 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
162
 Id. at 1182.
163 /4
164 hi.
84	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 35:49
tiff for asserting in court the right against employment discrimination
and would give the employer a windfall.' 65 The Wallace court, therefore,
would allow early termination of a plaintiff's right to backpay only if
an employer could prove that it would have acquired the discharge-
generating evidence before judgment in the employment discrimina-
tion action whether or not the plaintiff had brought the action.' 6
While the Wallace approach to backpay in after-acquired evidence
cases at first glance seems correct, ultimately it is wrong. Anyone who
contemplates bringing an employment discrimination action must
weigh the risk that the defendant will uncover, in preparing for trial,
information about the plaintiff that triggers a discharge policy. There
is nothing inherently illegitimate about an employer's acquisition of
such information through pretrial discovery or through its own pretrial
investigation. The Wallace court seems to recognize this point in deny-
ing reinstatement in after-acquired evidence cases, 167 but then ignores
the point on the issue of backpay. If reinstatement should not be
available, then full backpay should not be available either, since the
basic purpose of backpay is to afford a "make whole" remedy covering
the period prior to reinstatement.
An employer's discrimination should not serve as a plaintiff's
guarantee of future employment. That the employer learned of the
wrongdoing through discovery does not alter the fact that it now knows
about conduct that, under nondiscriminatory and thus lawful policies,
disqualifies the plaintiff from further employment. It is doubtful Con-
gress intended to require judges, juries or employers to turn a blind
eye to this information. While Congress has outlawed discrimination,
it has been careful to otherwise preserve managerial prerogatives.
Section 706(g) of Title VII, for example, instructs that a court shall
not order backpay or reinstatement when an employer acts for any
reason other than discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin. 1 f8 By its terms, section 706(g) does not
forbid a full backpay or reinstatement remedy in an after-acquired
165 Id. The Eleventh Circuit's position derives from the notion embodied in Franks and
Teamsters that a prevailing plaintiff is to he placed in the position she would have been in had
no discrimination occurred. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. When a defendant would
not have discovered the wrongdoing absent its own discrimination, full backpay, the court
reasons, puts the plaintiff where she would have been had no discrimination occurred.
Franks and Teamsters, however, while providing support for the Eleventh Circuit's position,
were not after-acquired evidence cases. To read them as mandating full backpay and reinstate-
ment in an after-acquired case is to read them too broadly.
166 Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182.
167 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 151.
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evidence case because the employer has discriminated in making the
employment decision triggering the litigation. But it suggests a con-
gressional concern over undue interference with management deci-
sions. That the employer acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing
through the litigation process simply does not seem to outweigh its
managerial right to act on that information. Surely, Congress did not
intend, for example, to allow the counterfeit doctor in the Summers
hypothetical to secure reinstatement. 169
Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which denies damages,
backpay and reinstatement to plaintiffs in mixed motive cases, reflects
a similar concern with preserving management prerogatives, although
it, too, is not diapositive in an after-acquired evidence case.'" There is
nothing to prevent an employer in an after-acquired evidence case
from unilaterally rehiring a discharged plaintiff upon its discovery of
the after-acquired evidence, thus ending the backpay period, and then
immediately discharging the plaintiff on the basis of the after-acquired
evidence. 171
 This second discharge would present the mixed motive
problem, and under section 107, the plaintiff would not be entitled to
full backpay or to reinstatement if the employer could sustain the
mixed motive defense, although she would remain entitled to compen-
satory and punitive damages arising from the first discharge. It should
not be necessary for the employer to go through a ritual of rehiring
and redischarge in order to secure immunity from full backpay and
reinstatement.
Finally, it must be remembered that backpay would not be re-
duced and reinstatement denied unless the employer can prove it
would have acted on the basis of after-acquired evidence. Because
questions of remedy will arise only in cases in which liability already
has been determined, establishing the after-acquired evidence defense
to full backpay and reinstatement should prove difficult for employers.
169
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing Summers hypothetical). See also Local
28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 447 (1986) (§ 706(g) confirms Congress did
not intend for courts to order employment of unqualified workers).
11() See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text For a discussion of § 107.
171 See, e.g., Chrysler Motors v. Allied Ind. Workers, 2 F.3d 760 (7th Cir, 1993). In that case,
an employee was fired for sexually harassing a co-worker, but an arbitrator ordered his reinstate-
ment. The reinstatement order issued after the arbitrator refused to consider other instances of
harassment by the employee because the employer was unaware of those additional instances at
the time it discharged the worker. After failing in its bid to get the arbitrator's award set aside on
the basis of public policy, the employer reinstated the employee, paid him one day's wages, and
then fired him, based on other instances of harassment that had not been considered by the
arbitrator. The Seventh Circuit upheld the employer's actions, reasoning that the employer
retained the right to act on the basis of the after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing.
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The credibility of an employer's hypothetical assertions of what it
would have done upon learning of the misconduct will be assessed
against the backdrop of a liability finding. That liability finding neces-
sarily will have resulted from a rejection of the employer's contention
that it did not discriminate. Having already been found not credible
on the discrimination claim, an employer presumably will have to have
powerful evidence to persuade the judge or jury that it would in fact
have acted on the basis of the after-acquired evidence.
This use of after-acquired evidence at the remedial phase may be
contrasted with courts' present, and improper, disposition of after-ac-
quired evidence cases by summary judgment at the liability stage, when
employers' affidavits routinely are accepted as dispositive. 172 An after-
acquired evidence defense presented after a full trial on, and a deter-
mination of, liability may be expected to be believed by the fact-finder
only in cases of egregious employee wrongdoing. And it is only in those
cases that full backpay and reinstatement would be denied.
B. Compensatory and Punitive Damages
An employer whose discriminatory conduct causes emotional pain
or other damages, or whose especially despicable actions justify an
award of punitive damages, should not escape these remedies merely
because the employer later discovers a nondiscriminatory basis for
discharging the victim. Compensatory damages attributable to the
employer's discriminatory conduct and punitive damages, therefore,
should be available in after-acquired evidence cases, if they are other-
wise awardable under the relevant statute.'"
172 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text Moreover, should an employer move for
summary judgment at the remedial stage, in reliance on self-serving affidavits making hypotheti-
cal assertions, rejection of the motion generally should occur. Because the employer's credibility
already will have been put in question by the liability finding, a question of fact on credibility
necessarily will exist, making summary judgment improper. See supra note 12.
'BAt the federal level, the availability of damages for employment discrimination varies
depending on the statutory regime, Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, compensatory and punitive damages
are available for racial discrimination by employers. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164,182 n.4 (1989). These damages should be available in after-acquired evidence cases
arising under the statute.
Under the ADEA, a prevailing age discrimination plaintiff is not entitled to recover plenary
compensatory or punitive damages but is entitled to an award of liquidated damages in an
amount equal to double the backpay award if the discrimination was willful. 29 U.S.C. § 626. In
an after-acquired evidence case, an ADEA plaintiff's liquidated damages should be reduced
commensurate with any reduction in the backpay award,
Under Title VII and the ADA, as amended, prevailing plaintiffs in disparate treatment cases
are entitled to compensatory and punitive damages, up to certain statutorily-established caps. 42
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As numerous commentators have noted, 174 and as Congress has
recognized, 175 discrimination causes its victims to suffer harms that go
well beyond lost wages. Discriminatory decisions "inflict psychological
injury by stigmatizing their victims as inferior." As Professor Paul
Brest points out, discrimination based on immutable characteristics,
such as race or sex, is especially harmful, not only because the victim
is unable to avoid the discrimination but because too often the injuries
are cumulative as well, given the pervasiveness of discrimination in our
society.'" These psychological harms of discrimination are not lessened
by the plaintiff's status as a wrongdoer. She remains a victim of the
"humiliation, embarrassment and psychological harms" that discrimi-
nation inflicts.' 78
There is a real and significant distinction, however, between com-
pensatory damages attributable to the employer's discrimination and
compensatory damages attributable to the plaintiffs status of being
unemployed. A plaintiffs right to recover compensatory damages for
the status of being unemployed should not extend beyond the point
at which the employer actually acquires discharge-generating evidence,
again because the employer is entitled at that point to treat the em-
ployment relationship as at an end, and the employer therefore should
not be held legally responsible for the plaintiffs continued lack of a
job.
On the other hand, an award of punitive damages serves a deter-
rent function. The employer who treats his victim "as less than hu-
man" by maliciously discriminating against her on the basis of, for
example, race or sex, is no less a wrongdoer in an after-acquired
evidence case than is the employer's counterpart in a case where no
such evidence is discovered. Viewed in terms of the defendant's con-
duct, there is no meaningful basis for denying punitive damages in an
after-acquired evidence case.
U.S.C. § 1981a. Prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Title VII had been construed as not providing
for the recovery of such damages. See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1874 (1992).
174 See supra notes 124-25 (citing sources).
175 See supra note 173.
176 Paul Brest, The Supreme Court's 1975 Term. Foreword: In Defense of the And-Discrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976).
1" Id. at 10.
178 Stonefield, supra note 103, at 124-25.
179 Weber, supra note 32, at 534.
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C. Section 107 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
As we have previodsly suggested, section 107 of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act supports a limitation of backpay and reinstatement in after-
acquired evidence cases. It could be argued that section 107 precludes
any monetary relief to plaintiffs in after-acquired evidence cases. Such
an argument, however, would be incorrect.
Section 107 places a significant limitation on remedies in Title VII
mixed motive actions. While liability is established "when the com-
plaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice,"'" an employer who
can demonstrate that the same action would have been taken against
the plaintiff anyway "in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor" 18 ' can escape some forms of Title VII relief. Although the
employer remains liable for attorneys' fees and costs, and the court is
free to impose declaratory or injunctive relief if appropriate,'" the
plaintiff is not entitled to "damages or . .. an order requiring any
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion or payment."'"
Section 107, however, should not control remedies in after-ac-
quired evidence cases. First, there is nothing in the text or legislative
history of the section to indicate that Congress intended to limit the
availability of damages in after-acquired evidence cases.'" Congress
enacted section 107 to modify the Supreme Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse, a mixed motive case.'" Second, there is an important
difference between the moral culpability of employers in mixed motive
cases and in after-acquired evidence cases that could justify the denial
of damages in one setting but not in the other.'" In mixed motive cases,
18° Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). For a discussion of
§ 107's impact on employer liability in mixed motive cases, see supra notes 134-46 and accom-
panying text.
i81 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(13).
182/d.
183 Id.
184
 The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is silent in all respects on the question
of after-acquired evidence.
185
 See, e.g., Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470,475 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (§ 107 modifies
holding of Price Waterhouse by providing for liability in mixed motive cases); Washington v. Lake
County, 969 F.2d 250,255 n.4 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).
188
 This is not to suggest that compensatory and punitive damages should be denied in cases
of mixed motive discrimination. For the reasons convincingly stated by Professor Weber and
others, they should not. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
authorities.
Section 107 has been understood, however, to deny compensatory and punitive damages to
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employers act from both permissible and impermissible motives, and
perhaps in the overall scheme of things such employers should be
accorded immunity from compensatory and punitive damages, 157 but
it does not follow that employers who act only from unlawful motives
and later discover nondiscriminatory reasons that would justify their
actions also should be accorded immunity.
In its recently-issued enforcement guidance to agency employees,
the EEOC rejects the proposition that section 107 limits the availability
of compensatory and punitive damages in after-acquired evidence
cases:
In order for a case to be considered one of "mixed motive,"
to which Section 107 of the new Act applies, both legitimate
and discriminatory motives must have been operating at the
time of the decision. If an employer terminates an individual
on the basis of a discriminatory motive, but discovers after-
wards a legitimate basis for the termination, then the legiti-
mate reason was not a motive for the action.'"
Although the views of the Commission are not binding, they are the
views of the federal agency charged by Congress with the responsi-
a plaintiff in a mixed motive case when a defendant carries its burden of proving it would have
made the same decision anyway. See EEOC Advance Policy Guidance; Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Law and Explanation ¶ 130 (CCH) (Dec. 5, 1991). Certainly, this reading is consistent with the
legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Early versions of the bill permitted these damages
to he recovered in mixed motive cases. Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act of
1991, H.R. 1 (June 15, 1991). This provision proved controversial during debates on the legisla-
tion. See, e.g., Cong. Rec. H3933, H3944 (June 5, 1991). The bill was amended to its present form
with the representation that damages would not be recoverable. See, e.g., Cong. Rec., H9529 (Nov.
7, 1991).
As enacted, § 107, by its terms, does provide that "the court" "shall not award damages" in
a mixed motive case when defendant carries its burden of demonstrating the same decision would
have been made anyway. Section 107 amended' § . 706(g) of Title VII.
Compensatory and punitive damages, however, are made available to Title VII and ADA
plaintiffs, not through § 706(g) but through 42 U.S.C: § 1981a. That statutory provision, located
outside Title VII, provides for jury trials in cases of intentional discrimination under Title VII
and provides that "the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as
allowed in subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g)." Excluded from
compensatory damages is any "type of relief authorized under Section 706(g)." Thus, notwith-
standing the wording of § 107 and its legislative history, plaintiffs in Title VII mixed motive cases
may be expected to argue that compensatory and punitive damages remain awardable by juries
under § 1981 a.
187 But see supra note 186.
188
 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Decision no. 915-002, Revised Enforcement
Guidance on Recent Developments in Disparate Treatment Theory, 1992 WL 189088, at 8 (July
14, 1992).
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bility of administering Title VII and, thus, deserve deference from
the courts.' 89
• It should be noted that prevailing plaintiffs in after-acquired evi-
dence cases also might invoke section 107, arguing that it makes the
entire array of Title VII remedies available to them, including full
backpay and reinstatement. The provision, after all, limits the availabil-
ity of these remedies only when the employer can show it would have
acted in the same way "in the absence of the motivating factor," and
in an after-acquired evidence case, the employer cannot carry this
burden because it acquired its nondiscriminatory reason for taking
action against the plaintiff only after the action was taken.'"
While section 107 does not limit the remedies available to prevail-
ing plaintiffs in after-acquired evidence cases, the principles previously
discussed provide those limits.' 91
 An employer who can prove it would
have fired the plaintiff upon discovery of her wrongdoing need not
reinstate that plaintiff nor pay her backpay beyond the point of the
discovery of the evidence .
The EEOC agrees that section 107 should not be read to mandate
full backpay and reinstatement in after-acquired evidence cases:
[I]f the employer produces proof of a justification discovered
after-the-fact that would have induced it to take the same
action, the employer will be shielded from an order requiring
it to reinstate the complainant or to pay the portion of back-
pay accruing after the date that the legitimate basis for the
adverse action was discovered . . . . 192
The Commission, however, goes on to say that the employer also
should be immune from the payment of "the portion of compensa-
tory damages that would cover losses arising after that date."' 93 This
last statement sweeps too broadly. In easily imaginable circum-
stances, a plaintiff could sustain compensatory damages after the
employer's discovery of discharge-generating evidence, but wholly
traceable to the employer's original discriminatory treatment of the
plaintiff. Such a plaintiff should not be denied recovery of these
damages merely because they arose technically after the discovery
of the evidence.
199 See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 80-102 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
192 EEOC Revised Enforcement Guidance, supra note 14, at 8.
1931d.
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D. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Attorneys' Fees
Under all of the major federal statutory regimes prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination, a prevailing plaintiff may be entitled to a
declaration that the defendant's conduct was unlawful 194 and to injunc-
tive relief to prevent further occurrences. 195 A prevailing plaintiff in an
after-acquired evidence case ordinarily should be awarded declaratory
relief. On the other hand, no injunctive relief generally should be
available to an individual plaintiff in an after-acquired evidence case,
because the plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement and therefore
would lack standing to enforce the terms of the injunction. 196
Prevailing plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases routinely
are awarded attorneys' fees. 197 A recent Seventh Circuit decision, Kris-
tufek v. Hussman Foodservice Co., 198 takes the position that a prevailing
plaintiff in an after-acquired evidence case is not entitled to any attor-
ney's fees beyond the point at which the employer actually discovers
discharge-generating evidence. 199 Such a restriction, like the EEOC's
position on compensatory damages, sweeps too broadly. Because after-
acquired evidence should have no effect on liability or on most forms
of relief in employment discrimination cases, a prevailing plaintiff
should be entitled to recover attorney's fees generated to prove liability
and that the plaintiff's entitlement to these forms of relief exists, even
if the fees are earned after the employer acquires discharge-generating
evidence.
E. Jury Trials and After
-Acquired Evidence
The pivotal factual issue in the after-acquired evidence defense—
whether the employer would have discharged the plaintiff on the basis
of the after-acquired evidence—is just the sort of issue one would
expect to be resolved by a jury. The question of whether there is a right
to a jury trial on the issue under the federal civil rights laws, however,
1 • 4 This is true under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); under § 1981, Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S, 454, 460 (1975) (plaintiff in § 1981 action entitled to legal and
equitable relief); and under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(13) (1988).
195 See supra note 168 (citing sources).
196 See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1992) (because
plaintiff should be denied reinstatement and therefore no longer would be employed, she should
be denied injunction against further unlawful practices).
197 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978).
198 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
199 Id. at 371 (plaintiff not entitled to attorney's fees for period after employer's discovery
that plaintiff falsified educational qualifications).
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turns out to be somewhat complicated. In a typical employment dis-
crimination case that is tried to a jury, the jury decides liability and
whether the plaintiff is entitled to so-called "legal" remedies such as
compensatory and punitive damages."° The judge, however, rules on
the availability of "equitable" remedies such as reinstatement and in-
junctive relief."' In an after-acquired evidence case, the would-have-
discharged issue is for the jury if the jury must resolve it in order to
determine either liability or the plaintiff's entitlement to "legal" reme-
dies. If, as this Article argues, the after-acquired evidence defense is
not a defense to an employer's liability for discrimination, then a jury
need not resolve the would-have-discharged issue in order to deter-
mine liability. The parties' right to jury resolution of the issue, there-
fore, exists only if the jury must resolve the issue in determining the
plaintiff's entitlement to "legal" remedies.
E The Would-Have-Discharged Issue and The Backpay Remedy
The after-acquired evidence defense is a defense to full backpay.
If the backpay remedy is a "legal" remedy for the jury's resolution, then
the would-have-discharged issue also should be for the jury. Unfortu-
nately, there is no single answer in federal law to the question of
whether backpay is a "legal" remedy. Under the ADEA, if either party
invokes the statutory right to a jury trial, the backpay remedy is treated
as a "legal" remedy, so that the backpay issue is for the jury,'" The jury,
therefore, should decide whether the plaintiff's backpay should be cut
off because the employer would have discharged the plaintiff on the
basis of after-acquired evidence about the plaintiff. Moreover, the jury's
determination of the would-have-discharged issue should be binding
on the judge with respect to reinstatement and injunctive relief. 2 o3
There is some authority for the proposition that the jury should
decide the backpay issue in section 1981 litigation, at least when the
claim for backpay is not coupled with a claim for reinstatement. 204 On
21K1 Belton, supra note 149, § 7.5.
201
202 1n Lorillard v. Pons, the Supreme Court inferred from the statutory language a congres-
sional intent to provide a right to a jury trial under the ADEA on the question of an employer's
liability for unpaid wages, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978). Soon thereafter, Congress amended the
ADEA to make explicit the right to a jury trial on the issue. Belton, supra note 149, § 3.28, at
117-18 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (2) (1988)).
203 See, e.g., Skinner v. Total Petroleum Co., 859 F.2d 1439, 1443 (10th Cir. 1988) (when case
involves both jury trial and bench trial, any essential factual issues central to both must be first
tried to jury, so litigants' jury trial rights are not foreclosed on common factual issues).
21}4 Setser v. Novak Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1142 (8th Cir.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 657
F.2d 962, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981).
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the other hand, there is authority for the conflicting view that the
backpay issue is equitable in character and therefore is for the judge."'
In the period before the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
the Supreme Court declined repeatedly to rule on the question of
whether the parties to Title VII actions were entitled to jury trials at
all. 206 Almost without exception, 2o 7 however, the lower federal courts
concluded that neither the Seventh Amendment nor Title VII itself
conferred a right to a jury trial." Section 102 of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act provides that "[i]l' a complaining party seeks compensatory or
punitive damages"" under the new legislation, then "any party may
demand a trial by jury . . . ." 2" Section 102 also includes the caveat that
"{c]ompensatory damages awarded under this section shall not in-
clude backpay . . . ."2 " If backpay is not an element of compensatory
damages, then arguably it must be categorized as a species of equitable
relief and remains the responsibility of the judge, as it was before 1991.
2. The Would-Have-Discharged Issue and Compensatory Damages
If an employer proves that the plaintiff would have been dis-
charged on the basis of after-acquired evidence, then in a jury trial
under section 1981, Title VII, or the ADA, the jury should not award
the plaintiff all of the compensatory damages to which the plaintiff
otherwise might be entitled. For example, a plaintiff who seeks com-
pensatory damages for emotional distress caused by a long period of
unemployment after a discriminatory discharge should not be entitled
to the full amount of these damages, because the period of unemploy-
ment after the employer's actual discovery of the evidence should be
attributed to the plaintiff's own discharge-generating conduct and not
209 Moore v. Sun Oil Co., 636 F2d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1980).
Zoe Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 549 n.1 (1990) (noting Court has not ruled
on issue and declining to express view on it); Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572 (1990)
(assuming without deciding that Title VII plaintiff has no right to jury trial).
207 In Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Judge Acker concluded that the Seventh Amendment
requires a jury trial in Title VII actions, 717 F. Supp. 781,783-84 (N.D. Ala. 1989), For a discussion
of Judge Acker's views, see Charles A. Horowitz, Note, Judge Acker's Last Stand: The Northern
District of Alabama's Lonesome Battle For the Right to Trial By Jury Under Tide VII, 39 WASH. U. J.
L1113. & CoNTEmP. L. 135, 167-71 (1991).
"See Wilson v. Belmont Homes, Inc., 970 F.2d 53, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1992) (reaffirming Fifth
Circuit position that plaintiff is not entitled to jury trial on backpay issue in Title VII action tried
before effective date of Civil Rights Act of 1991, and noting unanimous view of other courts of
appeals to same effect).
"Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)).
210 7d. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1)).
211 id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2)).
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to the employer's discrimination. In a case, then, in which a plaintiff
seeks compensatory damages, the jury ordinarily should resolve the
would-have-discharged issue as part of the jury's responsibility to fix
the amount of the compensatory damages.
Given that the backpay issue is for the jury under the ADEA and
that most plaintiffs bringing disparate treatment claims under section
1981, Title VII, or the ADA will seek compensatory damages, jury
resolution of the would-have-discharged issue should be the rule rather
than the exception in federal employment discrimination litigation.
Moreover, even in cases in which there is no statutory or constitutional
right to jury resolution of the issue, it only makes sense for the court
to use a sitting jury as an advisory jury on the question of what the
employer would have done."' The issue is not a technical or complex
one, and it is one about which a body of ordinary citizens might have
useful insight. Judge Acker, in defending his decision to impanel an
advisory jury in a pre-1991 Title VII action, quoted G.K. Chesterton:
Our civilization has decided, and very justly decided, that
determining the guilt or innocence of men is a thing too
important to be trusted to trained men. If it wishes for light
upon that awful matter, it asks men who know no more law
than I know, but who can feel the things that I felt in the jury
box. When it wants a library catalogued, or the solar system
discovered, or any trifle of that kind, it uses up its specialists.
But when it wishes anything done which is really serious, it
collects twelve of the ordinary men standing round."
CONCLUSION
After-acquired evidence has rapidly developed into a powerful
defense tactic for employers charged with unlawful discrimination.
Courts err, however, in viewing this evidence as liability limiting. For
liability purposes, what matters is the employer's motivation at the time
the adverse employment decision is made. If the employer took action
against an employee because of, for example, her race or sex, statutory
causation requirements are satisfied. That an employer would have
been justified in acting for nondiscriminatory reasons should not dis-
guise the fact that it did act for discriminatory ones.
212 For a discussion of the use of advisory juries in employment discrimination cases, see
Belton, supra note 149, § 3.31.
Bozeman v. Sloss Indus. Corp., 138 F.R.D. 590, 592-93 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (quoting GILBERT
GHESTIERTON, TREMENDOUS TRIFLES: THE TWELVE MEN 86-87 (1922)).
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Moreover, because the discrimination is determinative, it visits a
tangible economic detriment on the victim, separate and apart from
any intangible harms. An employee who loses her job due to the
discriminatory animus of her employer has suffered an injury. She was
fired when she was fired for unlawful reasons. A compensable injury
has occurred.
After-acquired evidence, however, is properly used to limit a pre-
vailing plaintiff's remedy. Although the employer has violated the law
in discharging the plaintiff, it does not necessarily follow that she is
entitled to full backpay and reinstatement. When the employer can
show it would have fired her upon the discovery of her wrongdoing, it
is appropriate to end the backpay period as of that time and to deny
the plaintiff reinstatement. Because the employer is entitled to act on
the basis of nondiscriminatory reasons, a partial backpay award makes
the employee whole in an equitable relief sense. Compensatory dam-
ages attributable to the employer's unlawful action, as well as punitive
damages, however, remain recoverable. That the plaintiff is a wrong-
doer makes her no less a victim of her employer's unlawfully motivated
acts nor her employer any less a violator of our nation's federal laws
prohibiting discrimination.
